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I.

INTRODUCTION

I

n May 2018, sixteen months after taking office, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres launched his global disarmament agenda, designating disarmament as a core priority of his tenure. 1 The agenda, which is set out under
four thematic strands in the publication Securing Our Common Future: An
Agenda for Disarmament, 2 comprises a template of immediate and long-term
ambitions. They include the elimination of nuclear weapons, ensuring respect for norms against chemical and biological weapons, mitigating the impact of conventional arms, combatting the illicit trade in small arms and light
weapons, maintaining human control of weapons and artificial intelligence,
ensuring legal compliance in cyberspace, and resuscitating the multilateral
disarmament processes and institutions. Notwithstanding the repeated references to “disarmament,” many of the ambitions set out in the publication
are concerned with ensuring that weapons are held, used, and developed in
full compliance with international law rather than with the reduction or the
elimination of weapons systems per se, save weapons of mass destruction.
The agenda is presented in the shape of a “non-paper,” understood in the
corridors of power as a discussion paper divorced from and not intended to
form part of the official business of the United Nations. The language oscillates between a utopian ambition, captured by the reference to “general and
complete disarmament,” and a realism conveyed through a vernacular that
is technical, legal, and scientific, if only to stay credible in this domain where
State sovereignty is preeminent. Whether it is meant as a peace offering, a
reminder, a provocation, or a combination thereof, on the cover of the nonpaper is a single paper crane.
Guterres is not the first secretary-general to prioritize disarmament.
However, he is the first to emphasize the need for the greater involvement
of women in the field of disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation
diplomacy. The proportion of women participating in multilateral forums
has increased in recent years. Yet, among State delegations, women remain

1. Antonio Guterres, U.N. Secretary-General, Remarks at the University of Geneva on
the Launch of the Disarmament Agenda (May 24, 2018), https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2018-05-24/launch-disarmament-agenda-remarks.
2. U.N. OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, SECURING OUR COMMON FUTURE: AN
AGENDA FOR DISARMAMENT (2018), https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/sg-disarmament-agenda-pubs-page.pdf.
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underrepresented, most notably at senior decision-making levels. 3 Notwithstanding their absence in the formal structures of power, women have engaged actively with disarmament for over a century, albeit often as actors
located on the periphery. Women’s activism in this field is a rich and complex one. It is, however, not a history that is generally familiar to those outside the world of feminist activism and scholarship. This article provides me
with an opportunity to tell that story and how women have sought to overcome exclusion, marginalization, and silencing in both policy and law in pursuit of what I describe as a transformative disarmament agenda. In other
words, this article is concerned not only with women’s political activism and
the struggle for equal participation in disarmament circles, critical though it
is. What I also seek to demonstrate are the ways in which feminist thinkers
have worked to reposition and reframe the disarmament discourse and challenge mainstream thinking on and around weapons and disarmament by
probing established assumptions and generating critical analyses in order to
provide new solutions to old problems.
To surface this history at this moment in time seems warranted. After
all, crises should present the opportunity for critical self-reflection and
change. 4 Existing approaches appear to have delivered little progress. The
latest world military expenditure is estimated to have been US$1,917 billion
in 2019—3.6 percent higher than in 2018. 5 This figure represents the fifth
consecutive annual increase and the largest of the decade 2010–2019. Over
the last eighteen months the normative regimes governing nuclear arms control and non-proliferation have taken a serious battering and, meanwhile, the
global arms industry has recorded unprecedented sales. 6
This article is divided into four sections. In Part II, I present an account
of women’s early activism in the field of disarmament against the backdrop
of inter-State efforts to advance disarmament through multilateral fora. I
3. RENATA HESSMANN DALAQUA, KJØLV EGELAND & TORBJØRN GRAFF HUGO,
STILL BEHIND THE CURVE: GENDER BALANCE IN ARMS CONTROL, NON-PROLIFERATION
AND DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY (2019).
4. Louise Arimatsu & Rasha Obaid, In Times of Crisis, LSE (June 9, 2020),
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/wps/2020/06/09/in-times-of-crisis/.
5. STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, SIPRI YEARBOOK
2020: ARMAMENTS, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ch. 8 (Military Expenditure), https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2020/08.
6. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Global Arms Industry: Sales by the
Top 25 Companies up 8.5 Per Cent (Dec. 7, 2020), https://sipri.org/media/press-release/2020/global-arms-industry-sales-top-25-companies-85-cent-big-players-active-global
-south.
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trace the strategies adopted by feminist peace activists 7 to overcome legal
and political barriers in order to shape the content and trajectory of interState disarmament efforts, including through the League of Nations. In Part
III, I turn my attention to feminist disarmament activism in the post-war
period, which has been shaped by two fundamental changes, normative and
material. The adoption of the UN Charter and the advent of nuclear weapons have each had profound consequences on how multilateral disarmament
has subsequently been pursued and conceptualized. Feminist activism
evolved in response to these contextual changes, but, to the extent that legal
equality has not translated into de facto equality, women’s voices have largely
been marginalized or entirely dismissed in the gendered field of weapons and
disarmament. This latter point is further elaborated in Part IV, where I turn
to feminist scholarship which has sought to conceptually reposition disarmament discussions, revealing how gendered norms, identities, and the structures of power operate to block disarmament efforts. 8 Common to this
scholarship is the view that while transforming gender norms and relations
alone is unlikely to advance disarmament efforts, without such change, there
is little possibility that any meaningful progress can be achieved. Building on
these insights, I conclude this article in Part V with some tentative thoughts
on the future of disarmament, including in the context of the Security Council’s Women, Peace and Security agenda, and reflect on whether international
7. There is no single “feminist” position on war, weapons, or disarmament. Women,
nor for that matter feminists, are not a homogenous group. In this article I focus on the
tradition of feminist activism that has always been opposed to war-making (and the creation
of war systems) and war-fighting as a collective social practice. Not all have necessarily subscribed to pacifism, although there is a strong tendency to reject violence as a means for
resolving disagreement. I use the terms “feminist peace activism,” “feminist anti-militarism,” and “anti-war feminism” interchangeably to denote this tradition of feminists. For
further elaboration, see Carol Cohn & Sara Ruddick, A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons
of Mass Destruction, in ETHICS AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR PERSPECTIVES (Steven P. Lee & Sohail H. Hasmi eds., 2002); Claire Duncanson &
Catherine Eschle, Gender and the Nuclear Weapons State: A Feminist Critique of the UK Government’s White Paper on Trident, 30 NEW POLITICAL SCIENCE 545 (2008).
8. Although this article introduces a distinction between activism and scholarship, there
is often little that separates the two. As with Marxism and anti-racist postcolonial critiques,
feminism is an explicitly political commitment which goes beyond theoretical critique. To
borrow from Gramsci, I regard feminism as a philosophy of praxis and share Otto’s view
that “activism is a form of critique, and critique – even academic critique – is a form of
activism.” Dianne Otto, Beyond Stories of Victory and Danger: Resisting Feminism’s Amenability to
Serving Security Council Politics, in RETHINKING PEACEKEEPING, GENDER EQUALITY AND
COLLECTIVE SECURITY 157, 167 (Gina Heathcote & Dianne Otto eds., 2014).
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law, reimagined, can more effectively advance disarmament in an age of increasing military spending, rising global tensions, and a noticeable lack of
political appetite to advance disarmament. 9
II.

EXCLUSION

“. . . as a woman, I have no country. As a woman I want no country. As a woman my
country is the whole world”
Virginia Woolf, 1938 10

As is well-documented, the idea of the international fora as a site for advancing
consensual disarmament among States, first proposed by Czar Nicholas II
in 1898, 11 was initially met with skepticism in capitals around the world. 12
The realists of the day regarded Nicholas II’s appeal, which framed disarmament as a precondition to securing inter-State peace, as a cynical political strategy motivated by the desire to end the then ongoing arms race and development of new weapons and new means of delivering them, spheres in which
Russia was trailing. 13 By contrast, the proposal was widely welcomed by the
9. The declaration adopted by States to commemorate the seventy-fifth anniversary of
the United Nations, contained a single terse and almost meaningless reference to disarmament that “international arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament agreements and
their architectures need to be upheld.” G.A. Res. 75/1, ¶ 9 (Sept. 28, 2020).
10. VIRGINIA WOOLF, THREE GUINEAS 197 (1943).
11. The Czar’s rescript, sent to the Great Powers of the day, opens with the declaration
that “the maintenance of general peace, and a possible reduction of the excessive armaments
which weigh upon all nations, present themselves in the existing condition of the whole
world, as the ideal towards which the endeavors of all Governments should be directed.” It
continues,
the Imperial Government thinks that the present moment would be very favorable for seeking, by means of international discussion, the most effectual means of insuring to all peoples
the benefits of a real and durable peace and, above all, of putting an end to the progressive
development of the present armaments.

For the full text of the rescript, see Peace Conference at The Hague 1899:
Rescript of the Russian Emperor, August 24 1898, AVALON PROJECT, https://avalon.law.yale.
edu/19th_century/hag99-01.asp (last visited May 21, 2021).
12. For an account of some of the reaction among capitals and within civil society to
the Czar’s proposal, see Daniel Hucker, British Peace Activism and ‘New’ Diplomacy: Revisiting
the 1899 Hague Peace Conference, 26 DIPLOMACY AND STATECRAFT 405 (2015).
13. But see Hucker, who notes how the Czar’s proposal was very much influenced by
Ivan Bloch’s publication in 1898. Bloch had argued that the “real Utopians . . . are those
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European and US-based transnational peace movements, which had long
been calling for the reduction in arms as a necessary condition to peace on
the grounds that excessive levels of weapons increased the tendency of States
to resort to military force as the primary instrument of statecraft. 14 Peace
activists had further argued that disarmament was desirable on social justice
grounds since resources could be redirected to human needs and away from
unproductive military purposes. Although the peace movements were dominated by men, many women had also joined, not least because such collectives offered a potential platform through which they could express their
opinions on political issues of the day in light of their legal exclusion from
the formal structures of power. 15
By the opening of the 1899 Hague Peace (and Disarmament) Conference, and following intensive negotiations among States, two additional matters for deliberation had been added to the agenda: the regulation of warfare
and the use of arbitration to resolve disputes. 16 As peace activist Bertha von
who believe in war [for they] are wasting the resources of civilisation” making disarmament
necessary. Id. at 408. For a more comprehensive assessment of the factors that influenced
the Czar’s decision, see John Mack, Nicholas II and the Rescript for Peace of 1898: Apostle of Peace
or Shrewd Politician?, 31 RUSSIAN HISTORY 83 (2004). Mack suggests that a close reading of
the rescript indicates that Nicholas was not calling for disarmament but only a halt to the
arms race. The arms race must be seen within the broader context of imperialist expansion
and the advent of the industrial revolution which, by the mid-nineteenth century, was transforming the technologies of modern industry (civilian and military), the means and methods
of warfare, weapons development, the production of military hardware, and the relationship
between private industry and the State. See, e.g., William H. McNeill, The Industrialization of
War, 8 REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 203 (1982).
14. There is now a considerable body of literature on the emergence of the peace movements that were very much part of the political landscape in late nineteenth century Europe
and North America. See, e.g., PETER BROCK, PIONEERS OF THE PEACEABLE KINGDOM
(1968); SANDI E. COOPER, PATRIOTIC PACIFISM: WAGING WAR ON WAR IN EUROPE 18151914 (1991); ROGER CHICKERING, IMPERIAL GERMANY AND A WORLD WITHOUT WAR:
THE PEACE MOVEMENT AND GERMAN SOCIETY 1882-1914 (1975); HELOISE BROWN, THE
TRUEST FORM OF PATRIOTISM: PACIFIST FEMINISM IN BRITAIN, 1870-1902 (2018). Critical
scholars have been careful to register the different philosophical traditions, origins, and priorities of these movements, which did not always share common objectives, nor for that
matter strategies.
15. The right to vote was extended to all adult men decades before it was to women.
In Britain, for example, full suffrage was not recognized until 1928, in France not until after
WWII, and in Switzerland not until the 1970s.
16. For the Russian circular of January 11, 1899, see Peace Conference at The Hague 1899:
Russian Circular January 11, 1899, AVALON PROJECT, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/hag99-02.asp (last visited May 21, 2021). Six months after it was first sent, the rescript

838

Transformative Disarmament

Vol. 97

Suttner would later remark, the introduction of questions concerning “military customs and the humanizing of war into the deliberations of the Peace
Conference” was a “wedge . . . calculated to rob [the conference] of its individual character.” 17 Even before the opening of the Conference, it was clear
that States had little intention to advance disarmament. This fact was tellingly
captured by the view expressed by even Russia’s delegate to the Conference,
Feodor de Martens, that “the Utopians, the most dangerous enemies of the
progress of international law, expected from this Conference a general disarmament of all the Powers, eternal peace and the abolition of war.” 18
Chief amongst the “utopians” were the women peace activists and, most
notably, the Women’s League for International Disarmament (Ligue des
Femmes pour le Désarmement International) which delivered to the delegates a
petition, with over half a million signatures, in support of disarmament. This
“remarkable feat,” as Sandi Cooper notes, was largely ignored by the male

was amended to reflect the exchanges among states. For a discussion of the amended text,
see 2 BERTHA VON SUTTNER, MEMOIRS OF BERTHA VON SUTTNER: THE RECORDS OF AN
EVENTFUL LIFE 227–28 (1910).
17. VON SUTTNER, supra note 16, 228–29. As von Suttner notes, “when the text of the
second circular is compared with the first, it can be seen how much water had been poured
into the fiery wine that was first offered to the world.” Id.
18. Feodor de Martens, International Arbitration and the Peace Conference at The Hague, 169
THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW 604 (July 1, 1899). This view was not uncommon among
the participating delegates. For example, in preparation for the conference Britain’s War
Office sought to demonstrate how “increased armaments enhanced the prospects of peace
and lessened the horrors of war.” More specifically, the War Office concluded that “it is not
desirable that any undertaking should be given restricting the numbers or the cost of Her
Majesty’s Military Forces”; “it is not desirable to agree to any restrictions upon the employment of further developments in destructive agencies, whether in small arms, cannon, or
explosives; or the methods of employing them”; and, finally, “it is not desirable to assent to
an international code on the laws and customs of war.” Draft of Instructions for Peace
Conference 1899 (on file with The National Archives, Kew, Sir John Ardagh Papers, Manuscript Collections, PRO 30/40/15) (emphasis added). Likewise, as forcefully argued by US
representative Richmond Hobson,
the proposition for universal disarmament at the present time flies into the face of the most
fundamental law of life and its advocacy can only harm the cause of peace for which it professes
allegiance. It is preposterous to advocate disarmament until some effective substitute for armaments is offered as a means of national self-preservation.

Richmond Pearson Hobson, Disarmament, 2 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
746, 734 (1908).
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peace community which had cautioned against pressing for disarmament. 19
In fact, in the run-up to the Conference, the male-dominated leadership of
the established peace movements had decided to direct their efforts not to
disarmament but to the establishment of an international arbitration mechanism, a core institutional element of a Kantian inspired new global order
founded on a then-nascent field of international law. 20 This strategic repositioning may have aligned more closely with the priorities of the major powers
but it did little to deter feminist peace activists from actively pressing for
disarmament as a necessary element of a broader strategy to secure interState peace. An international arbitration mechanism was essential to prevent
conflict, they reasoned, but not at the expense of delaying disarmament.
Moreover, for many women, the primary sources of insecurity were those
they confronted daily in the shape of economic and social insecurity. The
increasing expenditure on weapons, justified by the State as advancing security, did not reflect their lived experience. The permanent war economy and
the diversion of resources from human needs to unproductive military purposes was not only an anathema, but founded on a fiction that did not correspond to their reality.
The 1899 Conference was a huge disappointment for women activists
and especially for those who—often at huge personal cost, financially and
socially—had gathered in The Hague seeking opportunities to influence the
delegates during the two months of negotiations. 21 With the exception of a

19. Sandi Cooper, French Feminists and Pacifism, 1889-1914: The Evolution of New Visions,
36 PEACE & CHANGE 5, 13 (2011). The position taken on disarmament by the mainstream
peace movements of the day appears to be far more equivocal than commonly acknowledged. As Cooper’s scholarship reveals, in 1893 Frederic Passy, spokesman for the French
pacifist movement, stated “disarmament was obviously the distant aim of our efforts, the
moment had not come to ask for it . . . to make what would appear to be an attack on the
army or what could be interpreted as a weakening of discipline, was totally contrary to our
method.” Id. at 13.
20. According to Cooper, when the Women’s League for International Disarmament
(Ligue des Femmes pour le Desarmement International) was first established in 1896, Passy had
strongly advised against using the word “disarmament.” Id. at 13–14. See also Hucker, supra
note 12, at 411, who describes the British government’s antipathy towards disarmament in
the run up to the conference as “not entirely out of step with the ambitions of peace enthusiasts”).
21. What is often forgotten is that in contrast to the official delegates, whose attendance
was supported by public funds, many of the women were reliant on private financial support
and support in-kind from their families.
840
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handful of high-profile figures, 22 most of the women found themselves consigned to the margins, doubly excluded, as peace activists and as women.
Political activism was not a new experience for many. Notwithstanding their
exclusion from the formal political fora, women had long been active in various overlapping social movements throughout the nineteenth century, having recognized that political influence could be wielded through collective
action. As Laure Bereni and Anne Revillard observe, the ideology of the separate spheres of public and private was
shaken during the nineteenth century by the growing and multifaceted engagement of women in collective action, usually organized both among
women and as women [and] it was within the gap between public and private, in the space of social, religious, or civic commitments where their
presence was tolerated, that women became active. 23

By the late nineteenth century, women-led organizations had mushroomed to also focus on issues that were of particular concern to women,
such as the status of married women, women’s nationality, women’s working
conditions, child welfare, and trafficking, thus filling the voids. Many women
had also joined mainstream peace movements but, when they found themselves being marginalized within these movements, which were replicating
and reproducing the same patterns of exclusion practiced by the State,
women began to form their own peace organizations. 24
This break enabled women peace activists to subscribe to a far broader
internationalist agenda and to pursue a more radical strategic outlook than
22. Foremost among those present was peace activist and journalist, Bertha von Suttner. According to Levenson, von Suttner’s residence “became a meeting point for diplomats
and leading members of the peace movement” during the 1899 Peace Conference. Alan T.
Levenson, Theodor Herzl and Bertha von Suttner: Criticism, Collaboration and Utopianism, 15 JOURNAL OF ISRAELI HISTORY 213, 222 (1994).
23. Laure Bereni & Anne Revillard, Un Movement Social Paradigmatique? [A Paradigmatic
Social Movement?], 85 SOCIÉTÉ CONTEMPORAINES 17, 21 (2012).
24. Leading peace activist Carrie Chapman Catt is reported to have described the established peace societies as “very masculine in their point of view” and “have as little use
for women . . . as have the militarists.” Quoted in Lina Schott, The Woman’s Peace Party and the
Moral Basis for Women’s Pacifism, 8 JOURNAL OF WOMEN STUDIES 18, 24 (1985). This pattern
of marginalization was not unique to the peace movements but replicated in all mainstream
social movements, including those dedicated to labor. It was not uncommon for women to
be excluded or denied access to decision-making positions within trade unions, reinforcing
the inequalities confronted by women in the workforce. Geert Van Goethem, An International Experiment of Women Workers: The International Federation of Working Women 1919-1924,
84 REVUE BELGE DE PHILOLOGIE ET D’HISTOIRE 1025, 1047 (2006).
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their male counterparts. 25 In particular, progressive feminists called for
greater attention to be paid to the gendered social cost of the arms race and,
through sophisticated critiques of imperialism, militarism, and women’s oppression, urged that the links between social and international justice be fully
recognized. 26 Thus, the convening of the 1899 Conference signalled a pivotal
moment for women’s peace activism: women began to shape their own distinct feminist agenda over the question of disarmament.
As for the Conference itself, insofar as general arms reduction was concerned, little was achieved by States save for the adoption of a voeu (or a
statement of future hopes) which called for further study on the technical
challenges of limiting specific weapons and the general problem of limiting
armed forces or military budgets. 27 That said, the Conference paved the way
for the emergence of a wholly new model of civil society engagement in the
shaping of international policy and law, a fact that did not go unnoticed by
feminist peace activists of the day. 28
25. For example, the women’s peace groups were far more critical of the colonial wars
being waged by their own governments than their male contemporaries. Eliza Riedi, The
Women Pro-Boers: Gender, Peace and the Critique of Empire in the South African War, 86 HISTORICAL RESEARCH 92 (2013). French feminist pacifists, too, were outspoken in their criticism
of Britain’s part in the Boer War, in sharp contrast to the male-led peace societies that were
far more reluctant to engage in public condemnation given France’s own colonial history.
Cooper, supra note 19, at 14.
26. HELOISE BROWN, THE TRUEST FORM OF PATRIOTISM: PACIFIST FEMINISM IN
BRITAIN, 1870-1902 (2003). See generally Cooper, supra note 19. Some of the early feminist
work cited by Cooper would inform the writing and thinking of leading feminist peace activist Jane Addams. For example, in Newer Ideals of Peace, Addams exposes how militarism is
deeply embedded in everyday culture. JANE ADDAMS, NEWER IDEALS OF PEACE (1907).
27. The only agreement reached on disarmament was that “the restriction of military
charges, which are at present a heavy burden on the world, is extremely desirable for the
increase of the material and moral welfare of mankind.” DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES: THE CONFERENCE OF 1899, at 233 (1920). While Geoffrey
Best describes the conference as a “misnomer,” more recent academic literature suggests
that the conferences did contribute to paving the way for disarmament negotiations in subsequent years. Geoffrey Best, Peace Conferences and the Century of Total War: The 1899 Hague
Conference and What Came After, 75 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 619, 631 (1999); George Aldrich & Christine Chinkin, A Century of Achievement and Unfinished Work, 94 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 90 (2000).
28. In the run-up to the conference, the leaders of the peace movements had captured
the public’s imagination and, consequently, were able to exert some influence both within
and outside government. James Tryon, The Rise of the Peace Movement, 20 YALE LAW JOURNAL
358, 371 (1911). That said, it is difficult to assess with any accuracy just how much persuasive
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Between 1899 and the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907, expenditure on armaments by most States increased. Motivated by the prohibitive costs of the arms race, coupled with increasing public pressure for disarmament, it was Britain, rather than Russia, 29 which pressed for a second
conference and the opportunity to revisit the question of disarmament. 30
Yet, even before the final invitations to the conference had been issued, and
certainly by the time “the most eminent men of [the participating] countries” 31 had gathered in The Hague, the political elites were aware that the
proposal for a limitation of armaments was “moribund.” 32 Disarmament remained on the agenda, although little time was accorded to the topic. As
Scott Andrew Keefer notes, “statesmen could appease pacifistic and economy-minded domestic constituencies and return from the Netherlands having at least tried to reduce expenditure on armaments.” 33 A somewhat bitter

force is ever wielded by civil society. Although the delegates for the most part saw civil
society as a “distraction,” they soon recognized that public opinion could provide a useful
tool in the process of treaty negotiations. David D. Caron, War and International Adjudication:
Reflections on the 1899 Peace Conference, 94 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 16
(2000). On the peace movements as the precursors to the international non-governmental
organizations that exist today, see MARY KALDOR, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY: AN ANSWER
TO WAR 87 (2003).
29. As Keefer suggests, having lost its navy in the 1904–05 war with Japan, it was not
in the strategic interests of Russia to engage in any exchanges that would risk limiting its
ability to rebuild its military capabilities. Scott Andrew Keefer, Building the Palace of Peace: The
Hague Conference of 1907 and Arms Control before the World War, 9 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 35, 39 (2007).
30. The vast majority of European States had little interest in returning to discuss disarmament. For a useful analysis on the domestic political factors that shaped disarmament
policies among the military powers during this period, see generally id. By contrast, in Britain, the Liberals had come to power on an electoral promise to cut military expenditure,
which in turn raised public expectations. Daniel Hucker, Our Expectations Were Perhaps Too
High: Disarmament, Citizen Activism and the 1907 Hague Peace Conference, 44 PEACE & CHANGE
10 (2019). During the intervening years, both the British prime minister and US president
had spoken publicly in favor of disarmament, raising expectations among the general public.
Hamilton Holt, The United States Peace Commission, 192 THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW 301,
308 (1910).
31. Opening Address by M. Nelidow, the Russian Ambassador and President of the
1907 Conference, 1 DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, THE
CONFERENCE OF 1907, at 47 (1920).
32. MERZE TATE, THE DISARMAMENT ILLUSION: THE MOVEMENT FOR A LIMITATION
OF ARMAMENTS TO 1907, at 327 (1942).
33. Keefer, supra 29, at 57.
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paradox for the peace activists was that the lasting legacy of the 1907 Conference came in the shape of the progressive development of international
humanitarian law (IHL) with the adoption of the Hague conventions that
sought to humanize warfare. Moreover, the decision by States to focus on
the prohibition of specific weapons was to pave the way for a fragmented
approach to be established and normalized at the expense of a more ambitious program of general disarmament. Once again, the only agreement
reached on disarmament was the reaffirmation of the voeu of 1899, namely,
“for governments to undertake again the serious examination of this question.”
With the outbreak of World War I in July 1914, the Third Hague Conference, scheduled to be convened in 1915, was canceled. However, war did
not stop over a thousand feminist peace activists from belligerent and neutral
States from gathering there between April 28 and May 1, despite official resistance and at enormous personal cost. 34 Most of the women had met before through the International Women’s Suffrage Alliance (the primary
sponsors of the conference) and recognized the strategic value of coordinating internationally. 35 The resolutions adopted by the women after four days
of deliberation have been described as “visionary” by scholars, not least for
their appeal to international law. The principles and goals identified in the
resolutions foreshadowed the normative and institutional developments that
34. Delegates from one German city were subsequently prosecuted for treason and
incarcerated for having attended the 1915 peace congress. JANE ADDAMS, PEACE AND
BREAD IN TIME OF WAR 15 (1922). Addams recounts how, on return, many of the women
experienced angry abuse and ridicule and were depicted as cowards and ostracized by their
own communities, not only for their pacifist ideals but as women for failing to conform to
gender stereotypes. For accounts of the 1915 conference and WILPF’s early history, see
HARRIET HYMAN ALONSO, PEACE AS A WOMEN’S ISSUE: A HISTORY OF THE US MOVEMENT FOR WORLD PEACE AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS ch. 3 (1993); LEILA J. RUPP, WORLD OF
WOMEN: THE MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL WOMEN’S MOVEMENT ch. 2 (1997);
MELINDA PLASTAS, A BAND OF NOBLE WOMEN: RACIAL POLITICS IN THE WOMEN’S
PEACE MOVEMENT (2011); Mary K. Meyer, The Women’s International League for Peace and
Freedom: Organizing Women for Peace in the War System, in GENDER POLITICS IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Mary Meyer & Elisabeth Prugl eds., 1999).
35. The conference was chaired by Jane Addams of the newly formed US-based
Woman’s Peace Party which was established in early 1915 in response to an appeal by peace
activists Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence from the United Kingdom and Rosika Schwimmer
from Hungary to US women who were protesting against the war in Europe. With the outbreak of war in Europe, women in the United States formed several organizations, including
the Union Against Militarism and the Woman’s Peace Party. In later years Addams would
co-found the American Civil Liberties Union and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. She was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1931.
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would be embraced by States over the following century, including, for example, respect for the territorial integrity of States; the right to self-determination; the creation of a permanent international conference and a permanent International Court of Justice; a system of pacific settlement of disputes; and the enfranchisement of women. 36 The “Women and War” resolution, the first of many on the topic that would subsequently be adopted by
the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), expressly drew attention to the different and disproportionate impact of conflict on women, thereby laying the conceptual foundations for a gendered
understanding of war and peace. 37 Insofar as disarmament was concerned,
the activists were unambiguous in advocating for “universal disarmament.” 38
Many of the proposals were subsequently integrated into Wilson’s Fourteen Points, bar the call for universal disarmament and equality. The latter,
it was deemed, was a matter governed by domestic, not international, law. 39
36. WOMAN’S PEACE PARTY, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF
WOMEN 14 (1915), https://ia800306.us.archive.org/15/items/internatcongrewom00interich/internatcongrewom00interich.pdf [hereinafter 1915 CONGRESS REPORT]. For a detailed
account of the proceedings, see INTERNATIONAL WOMEN’S COMMITTEE FOR PERMANENT
PEACE, INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF WOMEN REPORT (1915), https://ia803101.us.archive.org/29/items/berichtrapportre45wome/berichtrapportre45wome.pdf. Jane Addams
personally met with President Wilson after the Congress. Wilson incorporated many of her
recommendations into his Fourteen Points speech. For full text of Wilson’s speech, see
Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, The Fourteen Points, Speech to Congress
(Jan. 8, 1918), AVALON PROJECT, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp.
37. The recognition that women experienced war differently and that they were often
disproportionally adversely affected was vividly captured by Emily Hobhouse. See EMILY
HOBHOUSE, THE BRUNT OF WAR AND WHERE IT FELL (1902).
38. As a first step to securing that end, the resolution called for an international agreement to “take over the manufacture of arms and munitions of war” and “control all international traffic in the same” on the basis that “the private profits accruing from the great
armament factories [was] a powerful hindrance to the abolition of war.” 1915 CONGRESS
REPORT, supra note 36, at 14. In its inaugural meeting in January 1915, the Woman’s Peace
Party likewise called for “the nationalization of arms manufacture” but rather than universal
disarmament advocated for the “limitation of armaments.” WOMAN’S PEACE PARTY, YEAR
BOOK OF THE WOMAN’S PEACE PARTY (1916). In its resolution the Woman’s Peace Party
further called for “organized opposition to militarism; education of youth in the ideals of
peace; the extension of the suffrage to women; the substitution of law for war.” ADDAMS,
PEACE AND BREAD, supra 34, at 7.
39. The political classes continued to insist that equality was a matter governed by domestic, not international law. As leading feminist peace activist, Rosika Schwimmer commented on the outbreak of war, “if there is a clear conscience among our women that they
had no part in the voting of funds to give men arms with which to slay, there is also the
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On disarmament, rather than universal, what Wilson proposed was the reduction in national armaments “to the lowest point consistent with domestic
safety,” a phrasing that continues to be used to this day notwithstanding its
ambiguity. Nevertheless, disarmament was once more placed squarely on the
international agenda reinforced by the popular belief—and importantly one
that was shared by some within States—that the arms race had created insecurity, thereby making war inevitable. 40
This reasoning was incorporated into the Treaty of Versailles, which required, as a first step, the disarmament of Germany “to render possible the
initiation of a general limitation of armament of all nations.” 41 The weight
accorded to disarmament was further entrenched by entrusting the League
of Nations, founded with the adoption of the Treaty of Versailles, with the
task of advancing international disarmament as its principal aim. Article 8 of
the League’s Covenant, the first operative article, expressly recognized that
“the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to
the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations” and set out a blueprint for action to
that effect, including a requirement for the League’s Council to address the
issue of the manufacture of arms by private enterprise. 42 In the early years,

feeling that they have been frightfully wronged while their hands were tied by a refusal of
rights.” Beth S. Wenger, Radical Politics in a Reactionary Age: The Unmaking of Rosika Schwimmer,
1914-1930, 2 JOURNAL OF WOMEN’S HISTORY 66, 70 (1990).
40. For example, a decade after leaving his post as British Foreign Secretary in 1916,
Sir Edward Grey would write, “the enormous growth of armaments in Europe, the sense
of insecurity and fear caused by them—it was these that made war inevitable.” 1 VISCOUNT
GREY OF FALLODON, TWENTY-FIVE YEARS: 1892-1916, at 90 (1925).
41. Treaty of Versailles pt. V, June 28, 1919, 3 U.S.T. 3714, 225 C.T.S. 189.
42. Article 8 continues:
The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each
State, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments. Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every
ten years.
After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments, the limits of
armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council.
The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The Council shall advise how
the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had
to the necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to manufacture the
munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety.
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significant efforts were directed towards addressing these latter goals as well
as with prohibiting chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare. 43 However, steps to advance the far more ambitious objective of reducing “national
armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety” were deferred
until 1926.
Excluded from the official proceedings of the Paris Peace Conference,
but undeterred, the women of WILPF convened their second conference in
Zurich in 1919. 44 The fact of exclusion would be turned on its head as a
strategic advantage. By convening parallel transnational gatherings, feminist
peace activists could ensure the airing of alternative perspectives through a
public platform and concurrently strengthen bonds within their own organizations and consolidate relations with other women’s movements that were
similarly excluded. 45 Moreover, unencumbered by the constraints imposed

The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to
the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programmes and the condition of
such of their industries as are adaptable to war-like purposes.

League of Nations Covenant art. 8. In addition, Articles 22 and 23 required the League to
take measures to regulate the global arms trade.
43. These efforts would culminate in the adoption of the Protocol for the Prohibition
of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65, reprinted in 14 INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL MATERIALS 49 (1975).
44. For details of the proceedings, see WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE
AND FREEDOM, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF WOMEN, ZURICH, MAY
12 TO 17, 1919 (1919) [hereinafter 2ND CONGRESS REPORT].
45. Also excluded from Versailles were women who had been active in the labor movement prior to the war. As with the feminist peace activists, feminist labor activists formed
their own organization—the International Congress of Working Women—and in October
1919 convened a conference in Washington, D.C. to run in parallel to the first conference
held by the newly established International Labour Organisation, which had been created
by the Versailles Treaty. In her address to the delegates, Mary van Kleeck expressed an
indignation that was shared by all feminist activists of the period:
Women have had no direct part in writing the terms of the [1919] Peace Treaty. It is a manmade peace. Women have had no direct share in the labor charter of the treaty. The agenda
of the coming [ILO] conference, with its emphasis on the protection of women rather than
the participation of women in plans to protect themselves and others, is significant of the
attitude of men, even in the labor movement, toward the industrial position of women. . . .
[W]e have yet to win the right to a wage based on precisely the same considerations that
determine the wages of men.
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by domestic politics and a State-centric framework defined by national security, feminist peace activists were better placed to unite over a more progressive internationalist agenda. WILPF was hugely critical of terms of the Versailles Treaty for adopting a differentiated approach to disarmament—one
that was enforced and immediate for the vanquished, and consensual and
prospective for the victors—which, it was maintained, was not a tenable basis upon which to secure a sustainable peace. 46 Instead, activists called for an
“immediate reduction of armaments [by all States] on the same terms for all
Mary van Kleeck, Address at the First Convention of International Conference of Working
Women, The Task of Working Women in the International Congress (Oct. 28, 1919). See
First Convention of International Conference of Working Women, Washington, DC, 33
(Oct. 28, 1919) (on file with the Mary van Kleeck Papers, 1883–1972, Sophia Smith Collection, Women’s History Archive, Smith College Library, Box 71, Folder 10). See also Christine
Chinkin, 100 Years of Peace Activism: Linking the International Labour Organisation with the WPS
Agenda, LSE (Dec. 16, 2019), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/wps/2019/12/16/100-years-ofpeace-activism-linking-the-international-labour-organisation-with-the-wps-agenda/.
46. On receipt of an advance copy of the peace treaty, WILPF adopted a series of
resolutions condemning the terms imposed, including on the grounds that “by the demand
for the disarmament of one set of belligerents only, the principle of justice is violated and
the rule of force is continued.” The resolution also expressed
deep regret that the Terms of the Peace proposed at Versailles should so seriously violate
the principles upon which alone a just and lasting peace can be secured, and which the
democracies of the world had come to accept. By guaranteeing the fruits of the secret treaties to the conquerors, the Terms of Peace tacitly sanction secret diplomacy, deny the principles of self-determination, recognize the right of the victors to the spoils of war, and create
all over Europe discords and animosities, which can only lead to future wars.

2ND CONGRESS REPORT, supra note 44. WILPF was the first international body to issue a
considered criticism of the Covenant of the League of Nations, although other transnational
women’s organizations were equally critical of the Versailles Treaty. In Peace and Bread in
Time of War, Addams writes:
In planning a congress of women it was borne in mind that the official Conference at the
end of the war determining the terms of peace would be largely composed of diplomats
who are necessarily bound by the traditional conventions which have so long dominated all
intercourse between nations. Because in every country such men are seldom representative
of modern social thought and the least responsive to changing ideas, it was considered supremely important that when the conference of diplomats should come together, other
groups should convene in order to urge the importance of certain interests which have
hitherto been inarticulate in international affairs. This need had been recognized not only
by the women but by international organizations of labor, by the Zionists and similar
groups, who were also planning to hold Congresses at the same time and in the same place
as the official Peace Conference After the War.

ADDAMS, PEACE AND BREAD, supra note 34, at 152–53.
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member-states” 47 and urged States to go beyond the terms of the Covenant
and commit to “total disarmament (land, sea, air).” 48 Dissatisfied with only
holding States to account, and recognizing that the arms industry consisted
of a partnership between public and private sectors, WILPF also resolved,
once the League was operational, to press it “to appoint an International
Commission, to sit in public, with power to take evidence on oath and to
command the attendance of any witness it may desire to call, to enquire into
the fact regarding profit-making due to war and preparation for war.” 49
The creation of the League marked a key development for international
feminist activism. Targeted lobbying by women’s groups during the Paris
Conference had resulted in the inclusion of a non-discrimination provision
giving them an institutional foothold. Article 7 of the League of Nations
Covenant expressly provided for the representation of women by stating that
“all positions under or in connection with the League, including the Secretariat, shall be open equally to men and women.” Although women delegates
were typically appointed to committees that were concerned with issues such
as social welfare and children’s protection, the very existence of the League,
which was tasked with progressing disarmament, meant that multiple opportunities were created for collective interventions by feminist activists operating within and from outside the institution. 50 The inter-war years saw feminist peace activists coalesce around two objectives: universal disarmament
and the regulation of the private arms trade. 51 Although disarmament was a
core priority for WILPF, it was not the only women’s organization pressing
for universal and total disarmament during this period. For example, following the United States’ announcement in 1921 of its intention to host a Limitation of Armaments conference “to bring about an all around reduction in

47. 2ND CONGRESS REPORT, supra note 44, at 244.
48. Id. at 245.
49. Id. at 254.
50. See, in particular, the assessment by Catherine Marshall of the significance of the
inclusion of women into the formal structures of the League. WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL
LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, REPORT OF THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS
OF WOMEN 64–68 (1921) [hereinafter 3RD CONGRESS REPORT].
51. For example, in 1924 WILPF adopted an amended constitution reaffirming as one
of its four core objectives “complete and universal disarmament on land, on sea, and in the
air, [and] for the abolition . . . of the prostitution of science for destructive purposes.”
WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, REPORT OF THE FOURTH
CONGRESS OF THE WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM 56
(1924) [hereinafter 4TH CONGRESS REPORT].
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naval and if possible other armaments,” 52 the International Federation of
Working Women, representing forty-eight nations, unanimously adopted a
resolution supporting “a policy of total disarmament” and urged participating States to “take steps toward the immediate disarmament of the Nations.” 53 Disarmament, it was reasoned, was necessary if the risk of war was
to be averted. 54 Moreover, increases in military expenditure could not be justified against the backdrop of rising unemployment and poverty. 55 Feminist
activists were acutely aware of the divergence between their stated aims and
the far less ambitious program being crafted by States. 56 Although WILPF
52. As made clear by President Harding’s invitation, which read: “the enormous disbursements in the rivalries of armaments manifestly constitute the greater part of the encumbrance upon enterprise and national prosperity,” the United States was motivated by
the desire to avert the looming arms race in the Pacific, as were the other participating States.
Conference on Limitation of Armament, President’s Invitation to Powers, 21 INTERNATIONAL LAW
STUDIES 1, 1 (1922).
53. International Federation of Working Women, Resolution on Disarmament, Second
International Congress (1921).
54. In her address to the International Congress of Working Women, President of the
National Women’s Trade Union League of America, Margaret Dreier Robins, stated, “The
first tasks of the working women of the world, to which we here stand dedicated, is to make
war against war. The first battle in that war is to stop increasing armaments. Armaments
breed war.” Margaret Dreier Robins, President of the National Women’s Trade Union
League of America, Address at the International Congress of Working Women Meeting,
Geneva, Switzerland (Oct. 17, 1921).
55. For example, the resolution adopted in June 1921 by the National Women’s Trade
Union League (US) notes that,
the hunger, suffering and misery of the people of the world following the tragedy of the
Great War, challenges the intelligent leadership of mankind with this supreme opportunity
to liberate humanity from the crushing burden and menace of increasing armaments . . .
and . . . the present programs for increasing armaments are not only economically intolerable but also continue the terror and panic of the peoples of the world, delaying reconstruction and preventing an effective peace.

International Congress of Working Women, Bulletin No. 11, July-Aug. 1921 (on file in the
Mary van Kleeck Papers, 1883–1972, Sophia Smith Collection, Women’s History Archive,
Smith College Library, Box 72, Folder 4).
56. See, for example, Gertrude Baer’s call to the delegates at the Second Congress of
the International Federation of Working Women that, “the limitation of armaments is nothing; let it be ‘Total disarmament or nothing.’” International Federation of Working Women,
Second International Conference (1921). Not all feminist collectives urged for universal disarmament, some preferring to support a strategy to limit/reduce military expenditure. For
example, the resolution adopted by the National Women’s Trade Union League (US) in
June 1921 referred specifically to the terms of the Treaty of Versailles and to the obligation
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would welcome the proposed naval conference “as a step in the direction”
to universal total disarmament, its National sections were encouraged to
“emphatically and continuously insist upon the original meaning of the term
‘disarmament’ in its literal sense, thus preventing the use of the term as a
camouflage for ‘reduction of armaments.’” 57 The optimistic assessment by
States of what had been achieved with the adoption of the 1922 Washington
Naval Treaty 58 was certainly not shared by feminist peace activists who, for
the most part, regarded the treaty as “a disappointment.” 59 The widening
chasm between feminist expectations of disarmament—understood as universal and total—and the outcome of treaty negotiations that were delivering, at most, a reduction or limitation of certain classes of weapons and
weapons systems remained a huge source of frustration for activists.
To exert greater pressure on the political class to commit to a far more
extensive program of disarmament, the inter-war period saw the piloting of
multiple transnational strategies by feminist activists, including the systematic collection of data for the purposes of targeted political lobbying; 60 the
“to a limitation of armaments” and urged President Harding “to invite Great Britain and
Japan to a Conference to arrange a limitation of naval armaments by agreement.” Robins,
supra note 54.
57. 3RD CONGRESS REPORT, supra note 50, at 121–22.
58. Following the conclusion of the treaty, the report of the American delegation concluded,
It is obvious that this agreement means ultimately an enormous saving of money and the
lifting of a heavy and unnecessary burden. The treaty absolutely stops the race in competition in naval armament. At the same time it leaves the relative security of the great naval
powers unimpaired. No national interest has been sacrificed; a wasteful production of unnecessary armament has been ended.

Report of the American Delegation submitted to the President, February 9, 1922, Limitation of Armament, 21 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 257, 278 (1922). The assessment proved over-optimistic in that loopholes in the treaty text were to lead to two further rounds of inter-State
negotiations in 1927 and 1930. These conferences on naval arms limitation were not held
under the auspices of the League of Nations. For the full text of the 1921 conference, see
CONFERENCE ON THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS (NOVEMBER 12, 1921 TO FEBRUARY
6, 1922) (1922), https://ia600207.us.archive.org/19/items/conferenceonlimi00cana/conferenceonlimi00cana.pdf.
59. 4TH CONGRESS REPORT, supra note 51, at 56.
60. For example, WILPF sections across the world were tasked with documenting the
obstacles to disarmament confronted by activists in their respective countries as well as the
barriers to tackling militarism in order to provide the leadership with the tools for exerting
political pressure in international fora. See id. at 111. In the United States, in particular,
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expansion of self-education programs; 61 and the promotion of public education initiatives 62 coupled with targeted interventions and campaigns around
international events and conferences on disarmament. 63 In particular, feminist activists fully appreciated the importance of being recognized as experts
in the field of weapons and weapons systems if they were to be heard in
mainstream discussions on disarmament and the regulation of the arms
trade. In 1924 WILPF urged sections “to investigate the development of
chemical warfare and its special dangers and to organize opposition, both to
end it and as a means of educating the masses as to the real character of war
in general” 64 and invited their members, Gertrud Woker, Naima Sahlbom,
and Ester Akesson-Beskow to form the International Committee Against

WILPF’s lobbying power was significant. According to Plastas, WILPF’s Dorothy Detzer
was one of the most effective lobbyists in the 1920s and 1930s as demonstrated by the fact
that, on the eve of London Naval Conference in 1930, President Hoover invited her to a
private meeting to justify why the United States was not advocating for complete disarmament and to ask that WILPF ease its disarmament campaign. PLASTAS, supra note 34, at 12.
61. Women’s organizations, including WILPF, regularly hosted “summer schools” and
workshops inviting expert guests to speak on topical questions of the day. These programs
were as much about informing themselves as well as “to enlighten public opinion by propaganda and education.” See also Earle on the strategies adopted by other peace movements
of the day, describing them as “a quantum leap in ideological and tactical sophistication over
what had gone before.” Neil Earle, Public Opinion for Peace: Tactics of Peace Activists at the Washington Conference on Naval Armament, 40 JOURNAL OF CHURCH AND STATE 149, 156 (1998).
62. As an international organization, WILPF actively sought to expand its geographical
reach and to proactively share knowledge through its sections. Thus, for example, it arranged for Gertrud Woker’s article on chemical weapons to be published in multiple languages for global distribution. 4TH CONGRESS REPORT, supra note 51, at 111–12. It should
be noted that even within organizations such as WILPF there remained unresolved fault
lines in respect of race, class, and nationality. While feminists were able to reach consensus
on the need to eliminate racism, colonialism, and imperialism, this did not necessarily mean
that racism and classism did not exist within their own membership.
63. For example, in 1930 a deputation of American, British, French, and Japanese
women representing different women’s organizations united to collectively lobby State representatives who had gathered for the London Naval Conference and to press for the reduction in war fleets as the “foundations of general disarmament.” DEPUTATION OF AMERICAN, BRITISH, FRENCH AND JAPANESE WOMEN RECEIVED BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 10 (1930), https://lse-atom.arkivum.net/uklse-dl1-if01005-001-0017-0001-pdf-59bfc415-789b-4f8a-8ab6-2d9341d7f147 [hereinafter DEPUTATION OF AMERICAN, BRITISH, FRENCH AND JAPANESE WOMEN].
64. See Resolution V on Chemical Warfare, 4TH CONGRESS REPORT, supra note 51, at
138.
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Scientific Warfare to better understand the implications of chemical and biological warfare. 65 In addition to launching public education campaigns, efforts were taken to foster expert networks by appealing directly to leading
scientists of the day to join in opposing the use and development of chemical
weapons. 66 The adoption of the 1925 Geneva Protocol was seen by WILPF
as a partial victory, although activists remained less than sanguine. 67 The decision by the US Senate not to ratify the Protocol in the wake of a coordinated campaign of political lobbying by industry and the military, both of
which were heavily invested in the research, development, and manufacture
of chemical weapons, brought home to activists the enormity and complexity of the resistance they would encounter in the field of weapons more

65. Both Gertrud Woker (professor of biochemistry and toxicology at Berne University) and Naima Sahlbom (a chemical physicist) attended the Conference of the American
Chemical Society in April 1924 during which time they visited the Edgewood Arsenal where
they witnessed various military exercises involving weapons systems using “different uses
of poison gases combined with white phosphorous.” Following their visit, Woker would
publish a short paper highlighting the indiscriminate nature of poison gas weapons. Gertrud
Woker, The Next War, a War of Poison Gas, https://documents.alexanderstreet.com/d/10
00690572 (last visited May 21, 2021).
66. The Committee on Chemical Warfare also took the decision “to appeal to scientists
of the world, urging them to consider their responsibility in the application of their inventions and discoveries for the purposes of war.” WILPF Newsletter from Geneva (Nov.
1924) (on file in the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom Collection, IV7-13, Archives, University of Colorado at Boulder Libraries, WILPF Papers, 1915-1978,
Microfilm, Reel 103, frames 1801–1803). National sections in Germany, France, and Czechoslovakia took proactive steps to appeal to scientists in higher education establishments.
WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, REPORT OF THE FIFTH
CONGRESS OF THE WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM (1926)
[hereinafter 5TH CONGRESS REPORT]. The Committee remained active throughout the second half of the 1920s and in 1929 organized an expert conference on “Modern Methods of
Warfare” keeping the issue of gas warfare on the international agenda. WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, REPORT OF THE SIXTH CONGRESS OF THE
WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM 28–31 (1929).
67. Although WILPF remained committed to universal and total disarmament, it took
the strategic view that supporting partial disarmament measures was a politically prudent
way forward and, as such, encouraged national sections to press their respective governments to ratify the Protocol. 5TH CONGRESS REPORT, supra note 66, at 153–54. Activists
were fully aware of the weakness of the Protocol, which did not contain a legal requirement
to reduce stockpiles nor a requirement not to produce the weapon. In effect, it was no more
than a prohibition on the first use of chemical weapons. For a useful critical analysis of the
Protocol, see Timothy McCormack, International Law and the Use of Chemical Weapons in the
Gulf War, 21 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 5 (1990).
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broadly. 68 In particular, the political strategies adopted by the anti-Protocol
lobby revealed—for the first but not the last time—the ways in which gender
norms would be invoked to block disarmament. 69 For feminist activism, this
setback made the regulation of the arms industry an even more pressing and
necessary element of, and step toward, universal disarmament. 70
The need for expert knowledge was not confined to science and technology but extended to international law, a field from which women continued to be excluded. 71 The potential for international law to secure change at
the national level—whether it was to advance gender equality or disarmament—was not lost on feminist activists who, notwithstanding the obstacles
presented, strove to acquire the necessary skills and knowledge to speak with
authority. Their radically different conception of international law as a counter-hegemonic means through which to shape domestic law was not one
shared by the political elites who continued to regard it exclusively as a tool

68. Naima Sahlbohm, Report of the Commission on Chemical Warfare, 5TH CONGRESS REsupra note 66, at 152–55.
69. Slotten observes how the anti-Protocol lobby regularly “characterized their opponents in patronizing terms as emotional and sentimental” and of how “attacks based on
gender stereotypes were a strong feature of these patronizing statements.” He continues “by
portraying the 1920s anti-gas movement as dominated by ‘hysterical’ and ‘unscientific’
women, the male chemists and chemical warfare experts hoped to defuse the assault against
their cause.” Hugh R. Slotten, Humane Chemistry or Scientific Barbarism? American Responses to
World War I Poison Gas, 1915-1930, 77 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN HISTORY 476, 492
(1990). On the interests that were at stake and the strategies adopted by the anti-Protocol
lobby, see also Daniel P. Jones, Chemists and the Geneva Protocol, 71 ISIS 426 (1980).
70. In 1926 WILPF adopted a resolution reaffirming its support for universal disarmament and further called for “the international control and supervision of the manufacture
and traffic in arms, poison gas, and munitions.” 5TH CONGRESS REPORT, supra note 66, at
122.
71. In Britain, it was only in 1919, when the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act came
into force, that women were allowed to pass their law exams and practice as lawyers. Although US women were able to practice earlier in a handful of states, until at least the 1920s
women were positively excluded from the “inner circle” of international law. For example,
the first executive meeting of the American Society of International Law in 1906 expressly
limited membership to “any man of good moral character, interested in the objects of the
Society.” As Kirgis observes, “women did not become formally eligible for membership
until 1920.” Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Formative Years of the American Society of International
Law, 90 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 559, 565 (1996). This change corresponded with women being recognized as having the right to vote in August 1920 with
the ratification of the 19th Amendment.
PORT,
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for regulating inter-State relations. 72 For States, preserving a clear distinction
between the international and domestic legal regimes was needed to retain
the authority to decide what matters fell within the purview of one regime
or the other, as a core element of sovereign power. Nonetheless, just as disarmament became a matter of international regulation in the first decade of
twentieth century, the idea of gender equality as a legitimate matter for international regulation would begin to take hold in the second decade. Feminist
activists also took a profoundly different view of IHL. Since as early as 1899,
activists had questioned the value of IHL and rejected the claim that the law
would protect the civilian population from the effects of modern warfare. 73
Thus, in contrast to other emerging international legal regimes, few feminist
activists took interest in acquiring expert legal knowledge and instead viewed
the evolution of IHL with growing disquiet. 74
The failure to reach agreement on general disarmament during the interwar years was not due to a lack of effort on the part of those who worked
72. Extant views on the scope and content of international law are best captured in
the words of the Permanent Court of International Justice:
International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law binding
upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by
usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate
the relations between these co-existing independent communities with a view to the
achievement of common aims.

SS Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 at 18 (Sept. 7).
73. “We have no belief in the possibility of humanising warfare nor of defending civil
populations from poison gases or other modern methods of waging war.” Statement by the
Disarmament Committee of the Women’s International Organisations in relation to the
Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments 9 (Feb. 23, 1932) [hereinafter
Statement by the Disarmament Committee]. This position contrasts with that taken by the
male-dominated peace movements which were not entirely antithetical to the progressive
development of IHL.
74. Feminist activists had since as early as the First Hague Peace Conference in 1899
taken this view. Many within the peace movements were shocked when the first Nobel
Peace Prize was co-awarded to Frederic Passy and Henri Dunant in 1905 as the regulation
of warfare and weapons was seen as legitimizing violence and an anathema to peace. As
Passy reportedly stated, “you do not humanize war. You get rid of war by becoming more
human.” James D. Fry & Saroji Nair, Moral Disarmament: Reviving a Legacy of the Great War, 40
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 1 (2018). “The Disarmament Committee
of the League of Nations, although clad in modern attire, reminds us most vividly of a
corporation called The Hague Conference, the task of which seemed to be to organize, or
as they thought, to ‘humanize’ war.” 4TH CONGRESS REPORT, supra note 51, at 56. See also
the assessment by Corbett Ashby, infra note 77.
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within the League. 75 In 1926 States would make one last attempt to advance
disarmament and arms control—by convening the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments—before the demise of the League
with the outbreak of World War II. 76 The 1932 World Disarmament Conference represented a turning point for feminist activism on two fronts. For
the first time in history, several States appointed women as official delegates,
disrupting entrenched prejudices that had barred women’s participation in
an area regarded as the exclusive domain of men. 77 Second, proactive steps
were taken by a handful of States to include women’s voices into the formal
process by extending special status to the Women’s Disarmament Committee (WDC), 78 a body which had been created in preparation for the Conference. 79 This move was supported by key figures, including British Foreign
Secretary Arthur Henderson, who presided over the Conference. The WDC,
which comprised fourteen women’s international organizations and five national organizations representing over forty million women from fifty-six
States across the world, had been founded in September 1931 by feminist
activists with the specific objective of coordinating women’s input into the

75. For a useful overview and analysis, see Andrew Webster, Making Disarmament Work:
The Implementation of the International Disarmament Provisions in the League of Nations Covenant,
1919-1925, 16 DIPLOMACY AND STATECRAFT 551 (2005).
76. During this period there was an increase in military expenditure and capacity by
States. For example, see Samuel Hoare, British Secretary of State for Air, Memorandum on
Disarmament (Oct. 6, 1927) (on file with The National Archives, Kew, CAB 24/188/33).
77. Uruguay appointed Pauline Luisi; Britain, Margery Corbett Ashby; the United
States, Mary Woolley; Canada, Winifred Kydd; and Poland, Anna Poradowska-Szelagowska.
78. The WDC (or Peace and Disarmament Committee of the Women’s International
Organisations) included the International Council of Women, the International Alliance of
Women, the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, the World's Young
Women’s Christian Association, and the League of Jewish Women, among others. Associated national consultative members included the National Committee on the Cause and
Cure of War (U.S.) and the Women's Peace Crusade (Great Britain).
79. A resolution tabled by the Spanish delegation to the League General Assembly to
“consider the possibility of studying the means of associating feminine action and feminine
feeling the work of the League of Nations by effective and direct collaboration” opened the
way for women’s involvement in the Conference. Secretary-General of the League of Nations, Memorandum, Cooperation of Women in the Organisation of Peace, in League of
Nations (Jan. 22, 1932), https://biblio-archive.unog.ch/Dateien/CouncilDocs/C-771932_EN.pdf. See also the report by the Spanish Representative, to “increase collaboration
of women with the work of the League.” Report by the Spanish Representative to the
League of Nations, Collaboration of Women in the Work of the League of Nations (1931),
https://biblio-archive.unog.ch/Dateien/CouncilDocs/C-632-1931_EN.pdf.
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Conference process. 80 In addition, the WDC functioned as a knowledge hub
and clearing-house for information; 81 an education and dissemination body;
and a campaign body dedicated to building global public support for the
Conference, including through petitions (just as they had done in 1899 and
1930 82) that were presented to the delegates at the opening of the conference. 83
Although the Disarmament Conference was officially suspended in early
1936, by 1935 it was clear to many, including the WDC, that there would be
no meaningful agreement on disarmament. 84 Any optimism at the opening
80. See Disarmament Committee of the Women’s International Organisation, Appeal
(1934) (on file in the Women’s Library, London School of Economics and Political Science,
Corbett Ashby archives 7MCA/C/08-09, Box FL484, 1934-1942) [hereinafter Appeal]. The
organization ceased operation about 1940. For a history of the WDC, see DENISE IRETON,
FIGHTING FOR PEACE IN AN INTERNATIONAL CITY: THE DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE OF
THE WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GENEVA 1931-1939 (2012).
81. In its fundraising appeal notice, the Committee described itself as the “centre of an
international network of communication.” Appeal, supra note 80.
82. In 1930 the Women’s Peace Crusade composed of women’s organizations from
Britain, the United States, France, and Japan, and representing over two million women met
with the leaders of the delegations at the London Naval Conference and presented them
with a petition with nearly 200,000 signatures.
83. Petitions with over eight million signatures were presented in a plenary session of
the conference on February 6, 1932. Arthur Henderson, Preliminary Report on the Work
of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments 14 (July 1936),
http://digital.library.northwestern.edu/league/le00089a.pdf. Some contemporaneous accounts mention twelve million signatures (with six million secured by WILPF alone). Records indicate that four petitions were circulating during 1930 and 1931 and, although some
were more forcefully worded, each called on participating governments to achieve meaningful disarmament. See HARRIET HYMAN ALONSO, PEACE AS A WOMEN’S ISSUE 120–21
(1993). The originals were destroyed—probably during WWII—although photographs and
film footage remain, as do unsigned copies of the petition (the petition is on file in the
archives of the People’s History Museum, Manchester, UK, LP/ID/DIS/2/3).
84. In March 1935, Corbett Ashby resigned from the British delegation in protest following the announcement by the British government of its intention to expand its air force
capabilities. Letter from the Prime Minister’s Office to Dame Corbett Ashby (Mar. 12, 1935)
(on file in The Women’s Library, The London School of Economics and Political Science,
Ref. No. 7MCA/C/05-06, Box FL483). For a damning critique, see Margery Corbett Ashby,
The Failure in Leadership at the Disarmament Conference 4 (1935) (on file in The Women’s Library,
The London School of Economics and Political Science, Ref. No. 7MCA/C/05-06, Box
FL483). In particular, Corbett Ashby was critical of “the attempt to humanise war” by the
Conference, which passed a “pious resolution” on July 23, 1932. She continues:
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had been dampened by increasing incidents of inter-State conflict, rising levels of militarism and nationalism, the emergence of fascism (and with it, the
persecution of minorities), and the re-escalation of the arms race. 85 In 1935,
the WDC changed its name to the Peace and Disarmament Committee to
reflect a widening of its stated objectives. 86 This intellectual shift represented
both a frustration with the lack of progress by States and a rejection of the
Aircraft, and in particular air bombers, were not to be abolished but air attack against civilians was to be “absolutely prohibited” and the number and characteristics of aircraft to be
regulated; it was also decided to limit guns and tanks, but no size or weight was agreed upon;
also to prohibit chemical bacteriological and incendiary warfare under certain conditions
(unspecified!). In the following months we did nothing but prevent and hamper the discussion of the regulation, publicity and international control that would be necessary to make
even the conditions of this vague resolution workable.

Id. As early as July 1932, Edouard Herriot, France’s Prime Minister, had observed, “‘to disarm’ is an irregular verb, with no first person, and only conjugated in the future tense.” 1
LEAGUE OF NATIONS RECORDS OF THE CONFERENCE FOR THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS 195, SERIES B: MINUTES OF THE GENERAL COMMISSION, 9 FEB. –
23 JULY 1932, at 195 (1932). See also the memorandum by the British Secretary of State for
Air which reads:
Whilst it is easy to make an argument for the futility of the Conference, I take the view that
the wise course for us to adopt is the course of friendly and cautious support rather than of
open hostility or negative suspicion. Quite rightly, we have repeatedly said “No” to the
several impracticable proposals for security that have been made by the League, and this or
that Continental Government. Quite rightly, also, we were not prepared to endanger our
naval security at the Geneva Conference.

Hoare, supra note 76.
85. In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria; fascism was on the rise in Spain (leading to civil
unrest from 1932 onwards), in Germany (with programs of mass persecution from 1933
onwards), and in Italy. In 1935 Italy, under Mussolini, invaded Ethiopia. With their initial
euphoria and optimism dashed, many women peace activists found themselves struggling
to remain committed to disarmament, especially against a rising tide of fascism. See, for
example, Clara Ragaz, Problems Resulting for the Work and Methods of the WILPF, MINUTES OF
PROCEEDINGS OF THE WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM:
EIGHTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS (1934). The rise of fascism divided women activists.
See Julie V. Gottlieb, Broken Friendships and Vanished Loyalties: Gender, Collective (in)Security and
Anti-Fascism in Britain in the 1930s, 13 POLITICS, RELIGION & IDEOLOGY 197 (2012).
86. In addition to pressing for disarmament, the Peace and Disarmament Committee
aimed to “spread knowledge and understanding of the great issues underlying the organisation of peace” and to “enlist the support of women in all parts of the world in the service
of peace.” Peace and Disarmament Committee of the Women’s International Organizations, Pamphlet (1935) (on file in the Sophia Smith Collection, Women’s History Archives,
Smith College Library, Folder 3, Box 5). See Peace and Disarmament Committee of the
Women’s International Organisations, Minutes (Sept. 11, 1935).
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siloed and decontextualized approach to disarmament adopted by governments. The recoupling of peace and disarmament opened the way for additional strategies to be developed and feminist peace activists were better able
to register the linkages between conflict and structural oppressions, 87 develop critical analyses that addressed the causes of conflict, and to advance
holistic strategies in pursuit of peace, integral to which was disarmament. 88
For feminist peace activists, universal and total disarmament could not be
divorced from the dismantling of the private arms trade, nor could it be divorced from militarism, colonialism, and patriarchy, each of which operated
to normalize inequalities between and within States.
Feminist activists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century had
not demanded political rights and the right to participate in political life
merely “to continue the style of politics which men had introduced into the
world.” 89 Rather, their ambition was “to change politics entirely.” 90 The core
of that vision was universal disarmament, a goal that increasingly united feminist peace activists across the world throughout the inter-war period. How
87. Feminist activism, exemplified by the work of WILPF, had sought to understand
the interlinkages and causal connections between, for example, imperialism, militarism, capitalism, accountability, inequality, the arms industry and arms trade, minority rights, and
sovereign equality. Underpinning this work was the awareness that disarmament could only
be secured through a critical analysis of the complex systems and structures that operated
as obstacles as demonstrated through the discussions held among WILPF’s membership in
1924 and 1937 around “A New International Order” or “Colonialism and Economic Imperialism” in 1926.
88. An example of this was the statement of aims as voted by WILPF during its Eighth
Congress in 1934 in Zurich, which stated:
the primary object of the WILPF remain: total and universal disarmament, the abolition of
violent means of coercion for the settlement of all conflicts, the substitution in every case
of some form of peaceful settlement, and the development of a world organization for the
political, social and economic cooperation of peoples. Conscious that these aims cannot be
attained and that a real and lasting peace and true freedom cannot exist under the present
system of exploitation, privilege and profit they consider that their duty is to facilitate and
hasten by non-violent methods the social transformation which would permit the inauguration of a new system under which would be realised social, economic and political equality
for all without distinction of sex, race or opinion.

Clara Ragaz, Address, WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM:
EIGHTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS REPORT (1934) (on file in the Swarthmore College
Peace Collection, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom Collection
DG043).
89. Lida Gustava Heymann, Survey of the Nine Years’ History of the WILPF, 4TH CONGRESS REPORT, supra note 51, at 42.
90. Id.
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women sought to shape the disarmament debate shifted over this period.
During the early years they often subscribed to essentialist notions as the
basis upon which to claim participatory rights in the field of disarmament
and weapons. But over time, and with their partial entry into the public domain, greater emphasis was placed on their expert knowledge that allowed
them to speak with authority on an equal footing with their male counterparts. Yet, whether it was within the peace movements themselves or in the
corridors of power at the League, feminists were fully aware that the downside of being heard was the need to speak in the prevailing masculine and
militarized language which, rather than advancing disarmament, blocked
progress. 91
III.

OBSTACLES

“It is very difficult to put together the words ‘Peace’ and ‘Security’ and make them agree,
and if you succeed in making them agree you will have achieved a great accomplishment.”
Madame Rudler, Addressing the
London Naval Conference92

Feminist transnational peace activism was suspended for much of the war
years. 93 However, in the immediate aftermath of the war, women’s groups
made certain that the institutional gains they had secured in the League were
not lost with the creation of the United Nations. 94 Several women’s international organizations, including WILPF, the International Council of

91. The absence of a common language is a theme addressed by Woolf in her essay.
WOOLF, supra note 10, at 6.
92. Madame Rudler, Address at the London Naval Conference, DEPUTATION OF
AMERICAN, BRITISH, FRENCH AND JAPANESE WOMEN, supra note 63, at 10.
93. During the war years women peace activists were subject to multiple and disproportionate forms of persecution by both Axis and Allied powers, albeit to differing degrees.
Harriet Hyman Alonso, The Longest Living Women’s Peace Organization, in WORLD HISTORY:
THE WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, 1915 TO THE PRESENT 13 (2012).
94. There was a real concern among feminist activists that women would, once more,
be excluded from international institutions. See, e.g., WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE
FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT, XTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM AT LUXEMBOURG, AUGUST 4TH-9TH, 1946, at 42–43 (1946).
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Women, 95 and the Women’s International Democratic Federation, 96 were
among the first non-governmental organizations that were able to acquire
consultative status to the Economic and Social Council, thereby giving them
access to certain UN bodies, including the General Assembly and Human
Rights Council. These institutional footholds, together with the subsequent
creation of special women’s institutions such as the Commission on the Status of Women, provided valuable international platforms to further women’s
particular concerns. Paradoxically, however, they also served to exclude
women from other areas, not least disarmament. 97 Thus, notwithstanding
institutional inclusion, in that non-governmental organizations had been accorded “no defined role” 98 within the UN’s disarmament architecture,
WILPF found itself unable to advance the case for universal disarmament,
made even more difficult by US-Soviet rivalry for military, ideological, and
political dominance and the advent of nuclear weapons. For much of the
second half of the twentieth century, anti-war feminist activism was shaped
by Cold War geopolitics and the schism which unfolded between nuclearweapon States (including those seeking such weapons) and States that sought
a world free from such weapons in the political form of the Non-Aligned
Movement. It was against this backdrop that feminists sought to develop
new and creative strategies to reposition discussions on disarmament (both
within and outside the UN institutions and multilateral disarmament mechanisms), and to challenge entrenched approaches and dominant views. 99
For anti-war feminists, the view—or rather claim—that has proved especially difficult to dislodge in the post-war period is (“the reductio ad absurdum
95. For a useful history on the International Council of Women, see LEILA J RUPP, THE
INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF WOMEN: 1888 TO THE PRESENT (2012).
96. The Women’s International Democratic Federation was established in late 1945 in
Paris by a group of left-leaning feminists. It was the most influential transnational women’s
organization among eastern bloc States and the global south during the Cold War period.
97. Hilary Charlesworth, Transforming the United Men’s Club: Feminist Futures for the United
Nations, 4 TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 445, 421 (1994).
98. Adelaide Nichols Baker, Work with the United Nations, 14TH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN, 27TH TO 31ST JULY 1959, at 57 (1959) [hereinafter 14TH CONGRESS REPORT].
99. WILPF’s activists recognized early on that with the advent of nuclear power “revolutionary” thinking on and around disarmament was required. Gladys Walser, Disarmament,
13TH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR
PEACE AND FREEDOM, BIRMINGHAM, ENGLAND 23RD-28TH JULY 1956, at 96 (1956) [hereinafter 13TH CONGRESS REPORT]. See also Kathleen Londsdale, World Events and the Nuclear
Revolution, id. at 81–86.
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theory” 100) that weapons are an effective means by which to guarantee peace.
Exemplified by Winston Churchill’s warning to a Joint Session of the US
Congress in January 1952 to “be careful above all things not to let go of the
atomic weapon until you are sure, and more than sure, that other means of
preserving peace are in your hands,” 101 this reasoning has been allowed to
take root and thrive by the very post-war normative architecture adopted,
namely, the UN Charter. In contrast to the Covenant of the League, which
was founded on the belief that the arms race had created insecurity, making
war inevitable, the Charter rests on the competing rationale that it was the
insecurity between States which led to the inter-war arms race and ultimately
war. 102 Thus, rather than recognizing disarmament as a substantive goal and
the precondition to peace, the Charter centers the prohibition on the use of force
and respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all States as its two
interlinking core values to “maintain international peace and security.” 103
This conceptual reorientation has all too often enabled States to insist on the
need for attaining national security as the precondition to disarmament. The Charter’s structure builds on this logic and stands as a constant reminder, reaffirmed by the International Court of Justice, that “in international law there
are no rules, other than such rules as may be accepted by the State concerned,
100. See ADDAMS, NEWER IDEALS OF PEACE, supra note 26, at 5, who comments, “certainly no theory could be devised which is more cumbersome, more roundabout, more extravagant, than the reductio ad absurdum of the peace-secured-by-the-preparation-for-war theory.”
101. Winston Churchill, British Prime Minister, Address to the U.S. Congress (Jan. 17,
1952).
102. This rationale was repetitively invoked by President Ronald Reagan with the words
that “nations do not mistrust each other because they are armed; they are armed because
they mistrust each other.” See, e.g., Ronald Reagan, United States President, Address to the
UN General Assembly (Sept. 22, 1986), https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/io/potus
unga/207355.htm. The rationale continued to shape US foreign policy throughout the Cold
War period and beyond. More recently, in its submission to the Preparatory Committee for
the 2020 Review Conference for the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the United States stated:
If we continue to focus on numerical reductions and immediate abolition of nuclear weapons, without addressing the real underlying security concerns that led to their production in
the first place, and to their retention, we will advance neither the cause of disarmament nor
the cause of enhanced collective international security.

United States Delegation, Creating the Conditions for Nuclear Disarmament: Working Paper Submitted by the United States of America, U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.30 (Apr. 18,
2018).
103. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶¶ 1, 4, 7.
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by treaty or otherwise, whereby the level of armaments of a sovereign State
can be limited, and this principle is valid for all States without exception.” 104
Articles 42, 46, 47, and 51 separately and collectively recognize that, in exceptional circumstances, the resort to armed force may be necessary to secure peace and security and thus reinforce the need for weapons, embracing
an ends/means paradox that cannot be resolved. 105 Moreover, as critics have
repeatedly underscored, notwithstanding the assertion that it is organized
“on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members,” the post-war
institutional edifice is founded on a hierarchy, distinguishing between the
permanent members of the Security Council and other member States, distributing political power according to military strength. Thus, for anti-war
feminists, a culture of militarism is embedded within the very fabric of the
existing institutional global order cemented through international law. Finally, the decision by the drafters to conjoin peace and security has served
not only to elide the potential discord between the two purposes—both of
which remain ambiguous, contested, and unquantifiable—but to recast, as
Churchill did, weapons as necessary to peace.
Disarmament was not entirely omitted from the Charter. Both the General Assembly and Security Council are charged with responsibilities for furthering disarmament. Article 11 grants the General Assembly the power to
“consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including principles governing disarmament and
the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard
to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.”
The Security Council is specifically tasked with “formulating . . . plans to be
submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a
system for the regulation of armaments” in order “to promote the establish-

104. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 269 (June 27).
105. Even setting aside the sentiment of the Preamble (“to save succeeding generations
from the scourge of war;” “to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another
as good neighbours”), Article 1, which identifies the purposes of the United Nations, arguably envisages a global order committed to non-violence. Yet, at the same time, Articles 42,
46, 47, and 51 all assume the resort to some form of militarized force. Nor, for that matter
can the Charter divest itself of violence to the extent that all law is constituted by and enforced through violence. The word “enforceability” as Derrida suggests, “reminds us that
there is no such thing as law that doesn’t imply in itself, a priori, . . . the possibility of being
‘enforced’, applied by force.” Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority,” 11 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW 919, 925 (1990).
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ment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources.” 106
However, the history of disarmament since 1945 reveals the singular failure
on the part of the Security Council to fulfill its mandate, in contrast to the
General Assembly which has, in the words of John Burroughs, “vigorously
exercised its power under Article 11.” 107 In particular, the General Assembly’s repeated reaffirmation of the interlinkage between peace and disarmament, redolent of the pre-war rationale, culminated with a significant breakthrough in 1959. The unanimous adoption of Resolution 1378 not only instated “general and complete disarmament under effective international control” as a substantive goal of the international community—and possibly the
most important one—but, significantly, recognized disarmament as a means
by which both security and peace could be achieved, disrupting the underlying Charter rationale. 108
106. U.N. Charter art. 26. The paradox is that permanent members of the Security
Council comprise the “exclusive club” of nuclear-weapon States and have, since 1945, been
the top global exporters of arms (with Germany).
107. John Burroughs, Legal Aspects of General and Complete Disarmament, in RETHINKING
GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 15, U.N. Sales
No. E.16.IX.8 (2016). For example, the very first resolution adopted by the General Assembly was to establish the Atomic Energy Commission with the mandate to make proposals
“for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major
weapons adaptable to mass destruction.” G.A. Res. 1, ¶ 5(b) (Dec. 13, 1946). Over the years
the General Assembly, through the work of the First Committee, has taken numerous
measures—creating mechanisms and initiating dialogue—to stimulate progress. For example, in 1952 the UN Disarmament Commission was established with the mandate to prepare
a draft treaty for the regulation, limitation, and reduction of armed forces and armaments,
including elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. G.A. Res. 502(VI) (Jan. 11, 1952).
The Assembly has also established the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (1980) and
the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (1982), facilitated three special sessions devoted to
disarmament, and adopted numerous resolutions on disarmament.
108. G.A. Res. 1378, pmbl., para. 5 (Nov. 20, 1959). A compelling argument can be
made that Resolution 1378 is binding on States by virtue of its now customary international
law status. It should also be borne in mind that resolutions of the General Assembly may
even modify the Charter. This has been recognized by the International Court of Justice in
its advisory opinion on the status of Namibia and confirmed in principle in the Nicaragua
judgment. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 104 (June 21); Military and Paramilitary Activities,
1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 188, 195. The adoption of the resolution galvanized efforts within the
United Nations to undertake studies on the economic and social impact of disarmament to
preempt domestic objections and resistance. For additional historical context, see MICHAEL
SPIES, UNITED NATIONS EFFORTS TO REDUCE MILITARY EXPENDITURES: A HISTORICAL
OVERVIEW ch. 2, U.N. Sales No. E.20.IX.1 (2019).
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The resolution was widely welcomed by peace activists, including
WILPF which, earlier in the year, had called on the General Assembly to
“consider disarmament as its most pressing task,” 109 made especially urgent
by the ever-shifting political positions among nuclear-weapon States due to
changing assessments around military capabilities. 110 All optimism was soon
dashed with the collapse of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee, the
political mechanism tasked with progressing disarmament pursuant to Resolution 1378. 111 Although the prospect for advancing disarmament was rekindled in 1961 with the adoption by the United States and the Soviet Union
of the McCloy/Zorin principles 112 calling for cooperation among States in
109. WILPF Disarmament Resolution, 14TH CONGRESS REPORT, supra note 98, at 93.
In its preamble Resolution 1378 recognized that “the question of general and complete
disarmament is the most important one facing the world today.”
110. See, for example, Gladys Walser’s observations that,
for those who have followed the disarmament discussions in the United Nations for the
past ten years, it is revealing and at the same time frustrating to observe the reversals of
positions of the two sides. For example, in 1946 and thereafter, Mr Gromyko contended
unsuccessfully that atomic and non-atomic disarmament were inseparable. The Western
powers after dismissing this claim, accepted it in 1951. Now in 1956, the same Mr Gromyko
insists there are no cogent reasons for linking the two.

13TH CONGRESS REPORT, supra note 99, at 102–3.
111. Although the General Assembly sought to retain ultimate control over general
disarmament, Resolution 1378 recognized the establishment of a parallel political process
in the form of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee, a political initiative supported by
the United States, Soviet Union, France, and the United Kingdom, outside the UN disarmament
machinery. It nevertheless required the Committee’s reports to be presented to the Disarmament Commission and to both the General Assembly and Security Council, emphasizing
that the “ultimate responsibility for general disarmament measures” belonged to the UN.
UN Disarmament Commission Resolution DC/146 (Sept. 10, 1959). The activities of the
Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee were terminated in June 1960.
112. See Perm Rep. of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the U.N. and Perm
Rep. of the United States of America to the U.N., Letter dated Sept. 20, 1961 from the
Permanent Reps. of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
A/4879 (Sept. 20, 1961) (transmitting the “Joint Statement of Agreed Principles of Disarmament Negotiations”). The Principles were widely welcomed at the time and endorsed
by the General Assembly, which created the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee
(later evolving into the Conference on Disarmament) to consider options for realizing general and complete disarmament. While some scholars have subsequently dismissed the Principles as a Cold War anachronism and a cynical rhetorical device serving to elide political
realities, others have viewed the initiative as the outcome of a moment of utopian ambition.
See, e.g., N.D. Jayaprakash, Conning Humanity in the Name of Disarmament, ECONOMIC & POLITICAL WEEKLY, July 27, 2017, at 35.
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reaching early agreement on general and complete disarmament, feminist
peace activists remained only cautiously optimistic. The subsequent release
by the United States of a white paper entitled “Freedom from War: The
United States Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful
World” 113 was interpreted by the Soviet Union as evidence of US insincerity,
but it also served to reaffirm feminist concerns that Resolution 1378 would
be read to privilege national security over disarmament.
Throughout the Cold War period the field of inter-State disarmament
was dictated by a narrow class of political elites within the United States and
the Soviet Union to the exclusion of most States and, for the most part,
women. Confronted by the fact that equality in law had done little to disrupt
the gendered space of disarmament (nor for that matter had it delivered the
equal distribution of political power), feminist peace activists sought out allies among some new and emerging States, including those within the NonAligned Movement which, at its founding conference in Bandung in 1955,
had declared that “universal disarmament is an absolute necessity for the
preservation of peace.” 114 In addition to urging for “disarmament and the
prohibition of the production, experimentation and use of nuclear and
thermo-nuclear weapons,” the Non-Aligned Movement called on the UN
“to continue its efforts” and “appealed to all concerned speedily to bring
about the regulation, limitation, control and reduction of all armed forces
and armaments, including the prohibition of the production, experimentation and use of all weapons of mass destruction, and to establish effective
international control to this end.” 115
113. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, PUB. NO. 7277, FREEDOM FROM WAR: THE
UNITED STATES PROGRAM FOR GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT IN A PEACEFUL
WORLD (1961) (emphasis added).
114. FINAL COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE ASIAN-AFRICAN CONFERENCE OF BANDUNG 6
(1955).
115. At its Second Conference of Heads of State in 1964, the Non-Aligned Movement
called for the convening of a world disarmament conference. In June 1965 the Disarmament
Commission adopted a resolution calling for such a conference, which was further endorsed
by the General Assembly in Resolution 2030 of November 1965. G.A. Res. 2030 (XX)
(Nov. 29, 1995). WILPF likewise pressed for such a conference to “assess all initiatives thus
far offered particularly those dealing with the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction,
establish clear guide line, formulate concrete proposals, and approve . . . an agreement leading
to general and complete disarmament.” WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE
AND FREEDOM, 16TH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL
LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, THE HAGUE, HOLLAND 26TH TO THE 31ST JULY
1966, at 127 (1966) [hereinafter 16TH CONGRESS REPORT] (emphasis added).
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Although the vision outlined in the Final Communiqué more closely
aligned with WILPF’s goals, 116 it did not escape anti-war feminists that for
States the goal of general and complete disarmament was framed by Article
26 of the Charter. 117 The provision recognizes the right of States to maintain
defensive capabilities, albeit at the lowest possible level, paralleling the stance
taken by the League pursuant to Article 8 of the Covenant, which had called
for the reduction of national armaments to the “lowest point consistent with
national safety.” Nor were feminists blind to the fact that the institutional
gains made by the global South, or indeed by members of the Non-Aligned
Movement, into the world of disarmament did not result in the inclusion of
women, let alone feminist goals. The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, which was established in 1962 and tasked to consider how to make
general and complete disarmament a reality, may have created space around
the table for those whose voices had until then been excluded, but the delegations—old and new—were comprised almost entirely of men. 118 For much
of its existence, Sweden’s Alva Myrdal remained the sole woman delegate
with feminist leanings to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee negotiations. 119
Feminist activism during this period was focused principally on protesting against nuclear weapons and testing. 120 At the international level, activists
116. See the report by Gertrude Baer in WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR
PEACE AND FREEDOM, 15TH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM: ASILOMAR, CALIFORNIA, U.S.A., 8TH TO
13TH JULY 1962, at 26–27 (1962) [hereinafter 15TH CONGRESS REPORT].
117. Article 26 of the UN Charter refers to “the least diversion for armaments of the
world’s human and economic resources.”
118. In addition to the original members, which included Canada, France, the United
Kingdom, Italy, the United States, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union, the new members included Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria,
Sweden, and the United Arab Republic.
119. For an insight into Myrdal’s view on disarmament, see ALVA MYRDAL, THE GAME
OF DISARMAMENT: HOW THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA RUN THE ARMS RACE (1976).
120. During this period, testing programs were conducted by nuclear-weapon States
within and outside their own territories, including in the commons. For example, between
1946 and 1958 the United States alone conducted sixty-seven tests in the Pacific Islands
region (which effectively became its nuclear weapons testing laboratory), including the detonation of a hydrogen bomb on March 1, 1954, that produced around fifteen megatons of
power, equivalent to one thousand Hiroshima bombs. As scientific data began to emerge
pointing to the severe long-term impact on human health of the radioactive fallout from
testing, women’s organizations such as WILPF began to focus their attention on the health
implications of testing as a basis upon which to prevent further testing. The fact that the
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sought to maximize the potential that the new institutions and processes offered, although it would take very many decades before some of their proposals would subsequently be adopted by States. For example, in the early
1950s WILPF appealed to the fledgling World Health Organization to consider the public health implications of nuclear weapons testing, but the suggestion was rejected on the grounds that the “issue of experiments with nuclear weapons is a political issue . . . and we at WHO must, of course, abstain
from any discussion of political questions.” 121 Two decades later, the World
Health Assembly adopted a resolution deploring “all nuclear weapons testing
which result in such an increase in the level of ionizing radiation in the atmosphere” and urged the “immediate cessation” of testing. 122 Amidst the

data was also showing that women were experiencing multiple miscarriages and stillbirths,
and were giving birth to babies with severe mental and physical defects as a consequence of
testing, gave additional weight to arguments that such programs were having different and
disproportionate adverse effects on women. The challenge for organizations such as WILPF
was identifying the institutional entry point through which their voices could be registered.
121. 13TH CONGRESS REPORT, supra note 99, at 24. It was the view of the then-secretary-general of the World Health Organization (WHO) that the matter did not fall within
the purview of the organization. Recalling her efforts to convince the organization to alter
course, Baer states,
I had taken the stand that WHO was responsible for the protection of public health on a
world-wide scale and that this responsibility was challenged through the fact that the lives
and health of many people might be and were indeed threatened through the effect of experimental bombing in peace-time. But WHO remained adamant in asserting that there was
no possibility of including this question in their deliberations.

Id. at 23. The WHO instead focused its attention to the health consequences of atomic
energy. The value of this work aside, WILPF continued to maintain its position that “military uses of atomic energy [was] of greater importance than its peaceful uses.” 16TH CONGRESS REPORT, supra note 115, at 122.
122. World Health Organization, Res. WHA 26.57 (1973), reprinted in 2 HANDBOOK OF
RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS OF THE WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY AND THE EXECUTIVE
BOARD, 1973-1984, at 121 (1985). In 1981 the World Health Assembly adopted Resolution
WHA 34.38 declaring the promotion and preservation of peace as the single most important
factor in achieving health for all and, in collaboration with the UN Secretary-General, established a committee of scientists and experts to undertake a “comprehensive study and
elucidation of the threat of thermonuclear war and its potentially baneful consequences for
the life and health of peoples of the world.” Res. WHA 34.38 (1981), reprinted in id. at 398.
The report, released in 1983, concluded that it was impossible to prepare health services to
deal in any systematic way with a catastrophe resulting from nuclear warfare and that “the
only approach to the treatment of the health effects of nuclear explosions is primary pre-

868

Transformative Disarmament

Vol. 97

increasing levels of testing among nuclear-weapon States, and undeterred by
the institutional resistance confronted, feminist activists continued to use all
opportunities available to them, including the international law-making process, as a means by which to prevent further nuclear testing. 123
At the national level, growing numbers of women joined mainstream
civil society movements to protest against nuclear testing by their respective
vention of such explosions, that is the prevention of atomic war.” Report of the International Committee of Experts in Medical Sciences and Public Health to Implement Resolution WHA 34.38, at 7, Doc. A36/12 (Mar. 24, 1983). In 1993 the Director-General of the
World Health Organization noted that the report “constituted WHO’s major contribution
to the International Year of Peace (1986).” Report by the Director-General of the World
Health Organization, Health and Environmental Effects of Nuclear Weapons ¶ 10, WHO
Doc. A46/30 (Apr. 26, 1993). The question of the WHO’s mandate also arose in connection
with the proposal to request the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on
the legality of nuclear weapons under international law and the WHO’s Constitution. While
the Australian delegate to the World Health Assembly expressed the view that “the legality
of nuclear weapons . . . was a political issue which did not fall into the arena of world health
and it was therefore inappropriate for the Health Assembly to consider it,” most States
disagreed and the request was passed 75–33 with 5 abstentions. 46th World Health Assembly: Summary Records of Committees 268, WHA Doc. 46/1993/REC/3 (May 12, 1993).
Although the International Court of Justice found that Article 2 of the WHO’s Constitution
could be read “as authorizing the Organization to deal with the effects on health of the use
of nuclear weapons . . . and to take preventive measures aimed at protecting the health of
the populations in the event of such weapons being used or such activities engaged in,”
Article 2 did not confer upon the Organization a “competence to address the legality of the
use of nuclear weapons.” Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed
Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 227, ¶ 21 (July 8).
123. WILPF had recognized the potential of introducing a provision forbidding nuclear
testing into the International Law Commission’s draft Convention on the Freedom of the
High Seas and actively lobbied States to support the proposal. Although the final agreed
draft of the Convention on the High Seas did not specifically address testing, WILPF welcomed the inclusion of Article 25, which appeared to provide the possibility for an end to
testing. Gertrude Baer, Nuclear Tests on High Seas, 14TH CONGRESS REPORT, supra note 98,
at 49–51. However, much to the disappointment of activists, the rejection of an express
proposal to prohibit testing was interpreted by States as permitting testing. This reading of
the Convention was made unambiguous by the chairman of the US delegation to the negotiations who, commenting on the treaty, stated “a variety of undesirable Russian proposals,
among them a rule banning nuclear tests on the high seas—the adoption of which would
have prevented the tests recently conducted at Eniwetok, and negotiations on that subject
now going on in Geneva—were defeated.” Arthur H. Dean, The Geneva Conference on the Law
of the Sea: What was Accomplished, 52 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 607, 627
(1958). That States were misstating the adverse consequences of testing prompted WILPF
to adopt a resolution at their 1962 conference expressing their “alarm [at] the attempts being
made deliberately to underestimate the dangers of nuclear testing.” 15TH CONGRESS REPORT, supra note 116, at 104.
869

International Law Studies

2021

governments, only to experience similar patterns of marginalization within
such movements. Frustrated that their specific concerns were not being
given due consideration, 124 women began to establish parallel organizations,
exemplified by the formation of the US-based Women Strike for Peace. 125
The Women Strike for Peace garnered considerable popular support among
mainstream America, leading to one the largest women’s protests of the
twentieth century when, on November 1, 1961, fifty thousand women
marched in sixty cities in the United States to demonstrate against nuclear
weapons testing. In adopting strategies that conformed with prevailing ideas
around women’s role in society as mothers, 126 the Women Strike for Peace
leadership was able to capitalize on public support and thereby exert some
influence over the Kennedy administration’s decision to adopt the Limited

124. See Amy Swerdlow, Ladies’ Day at the Capitol: Women Strike for Peace versus HUAC, 8
FEMINIST STUDIES 493 (1982). According to Swerdlow, the five women who established
the Women Strike for Peace were previously members of the National Committee for a
Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) but
gravitated toward each other because of their mutual distaste for SANE’s internal red hunt,
which they felt contributed to an escalation, rather than an end to cold war hysteria . . . [and]
resented the reluctance of SANE’s male leadership to deal with “mother’s issues” such as
the contamination of milk by radioactive fallout from nuclear tests.

Id. at 509.
125. The emergence of Women Strike for Peace must also be seen in the context of
rising feminist activism in the United States with the publication of Betty Friedan’s book,
The Feminine Mystique. BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963). Although it was
rightly criticized for its narrow perspective, the book became a bestseller and to that extent
was highly influential within popular culture, in particular, among white middle class women.
126. For example, see interview with Dagmar Wilson, the long-standing spokesperson
for the Women Strike for Peace, where Wilson stated:
You know how men are. They talk in abstractions and the technicalities of the bomb, almost
as if this were all a game of chess. Well, it isn’t. . . . There are times, it seems to me, when
the only thing to do is let out a loud scream. . . . Just women raising a hue and cry against
nuclear weapons for all of them to cut it out.

Quoted in Elaine Woo, Dagmar Wilson Dies at 94; Organizer of Women’s Disarmament Protesters,
LOS ANGELES TIMES (Jan. 30, 2011), https://www.latimes.com/local/obituaries/la-medagmar-wilson-20110130-story.html. For how shifting gender identities influenced
women’s political activism, see also Lisa Yaszek, Stories ‘That Only a Mother’ Could Write, 16
NATIONAL WOMEN’S STUDIES ASSOCIATION JOURNAL, Summer 2004, at 70, 72–73 (2004).
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Test Ban Treaty in 1963. 127 The “politics of motherhood” strategy nevertheless alienated the more progressive generation of feminists who viewed such
strategies as perpetuating sex role stereotypes and thus wholly counter-productive in the struggle for gender equality. 128 Committed to challenging socially constructed notions of women, these feminists rejected being identified through traditional role models as mothers and wives but rather sought
to claim political power as women on an equal basis with men. Although the
Women Strike for Peace secured mainstream public support in the early
years, this did not shield them from the toxic political climate of the 1960s. 129
Nor, for that matter, did public support last when the activists stepped outside their traditional feminine roles to challenge the culture of militarism and
of political ideology. 130 For anti-war feminist activists, the consequences of
127. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43. The treaty entered into force
in October 1963 with the ratification by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United
Kingdom. On how much influence the Women Strike for Peace had on Kennedy’s decision,
see Swerdlow, supra note 124, at 496–97; Susan Frances Dion, Challenges to Cold War Orthodoxy: Women and Peace, 1945-1963, at 221–22 (Sept. 1991) (Ph.D. dissertation, Marquette University). Although the Women Strike for Peace maintained a constant barrage of
activities, including letter writing, political lobbying, demonstrations, and vigils, the political
influence wielded by the group should not be overstated. The Kennedy administration was
already in discussions with the Soviet Union over the prospect of banning testing in both
bilateral and multilateral fora. Efforts to negotiate a treaty had been ongoing since 1955
within the Subcommittee of Five (United States, United Kingdom, Canada, France, and
Soviet Union) of the UN Disarmament Commission and talks were ongoing within the
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. Between 1958 and 1963 the General Assembly
adopted a dozen resolutions pressing for a test ban agreement under international control.
Although all talks came to a standstill in 1962, culminating in the Cuban Missile Crisis in
October of that year, following the crisis direct talks resumed between the United States,
the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom and by the spring of 1963 agreement had been
reached to negotiate a test ban treaty.
128. For anti-war feminist activists it was the essentialist discourse, reasoning, and strategies adopted by the Women Strike for Peace that were problematic.
129. In 1962 members of the Women Strike for Peace and WILPF, and other women
peace activists, were required to testify before the House Committee on Un-American Activities as part of an investigation into “communist activities in the peace movements.”
Somewhat problematically, the Women Strike for Peace justified their opposition to the
arms race and nuclear testing by identifying themselves as mothers anxious to protect their
children. Hearings before the H. Comm. on Un-American Activities, 87th Cong. 2074
(1963).
130. Six years later, when the same women protested against Vietnam, they were castigated by the media for being “too militant.” Geoff Eley, From Welfare Politics to Welfare States:
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speaking out during this period were harsh: sometimes they were criminalized, 131 often they were silenced and their organizations were forced to disband, 132 and always they were ostracized for their political views and their
gender. 133
Women and the Socialist Question, in WOMEN AND SOCIALISM – SOCIALISM AND WOMEN 516
(Helmut Gurber & Pamela Graves eds., 1998).
131. According to Dion, Marjorie Swann, a WILPF activist, was arrested and sentenced
to a West Virginia federal women’s prison for protesting against nuclear missiles in 1959.
Dion, supra note 127, at 65. Likewise, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, hundreds of women
peace activists protesting the deployment of US cruise missiles with nuclear warheads at
Greenham Common in the United Kingdom were arrested and criminalized for breaching
bylaws introduced by the government in 1985 pursuant to the 1892 Military Lands Act.
132. In the United States, women’s organizations with left wing sympathies were targeted and some, including the Congress of American Women (CAW), were forced to disband, having come under the scrutiny of the House Committee on Un-American Activities.
See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 81-1953 (1949) (report by the House Committee on Un-American
Activities on the Congress of American Women). The CAW was established in 1946 and
was racially diverse and founded on strong feminist/pacifist principles. However, it was
aligned to the Women’s International Democratic Federation, an organization which was
seen as a “front” for the Soviet Union and consequently its members came under enormous
pressure during the McCarthy years. See Harriet Hyman Alonso, Mayhem and Moderation:
Women Peace Activists during the McCarthy Era, in NOT JUNE CLEAVER: WOMEN AND GENDER
IN POSTWAR AMERICA, 1945-1960, at 148 (Joanne Meyerowitz ed., 1994). The history of the
Women’s International Democratic Federation itself remains buried and only in recent years
have academics begun to reverse the legacy of the Cold War to surface the histories of
Second and Third World women’s movements. See, e.g., FRANCISCA DE HAAN, THE
WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FEDERATION: HISTORY, MAIN AGENDA AND
CONTRIBUTIONS 1945-1991 (2012); Magdalena Grabowska, Beyond the “Development” Paradigm: State Socialist Women’s Activism, Transnationalism, and the “Long Sixties,” in WOMEN’S ACTIVISM AND “SECOND WAVE” FEMINISM: TRANSNATIONAL HISTORIES 147 (Barbara Moloney & Jennifer Nelson eds., 2017); KRISTEN GHODSEE, SECOND WORLD, SECOND SEX:
SOCIALIST WOMEN’S ACTIVISM AND GLOBAL SOLIDARITY DURING THE COLD WAR
(2019). Although the Women’s International Democratic Federation was concerned with
disarmament, few records remain of, for example, the 1962 World Gathering of Women
for Disarmament convened by the Women’s International Democratic Federation that
brought together feminist activists from fifty-nine States calling for the ending of nuclear
testing, the destruction of atomic weapons stockpiles, and the dismantling of military bases
and withdrawal of troops stationed on foreign territory. WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FEDERATION, WORLD GATHERING OF WOMEN FOR DISARMAMENT (1962). Likewise, few records exist on the activities of the European Movement of Women against Nuclear Armament.
133. Archival records and more recent scholarship have revealed the extent of the hostility directed towards feminist peace activist protesting the deployment of nuclear weapons
by local communities. See, for example, Home Office papers on Powers and Procedures of
the Police: Greenham Common, HO287/3094.
872

Transformative Disarmament

Vol. 97

Notwithstanding the hostile domestic environment and escalating Cold
War tensions, women activists continued to build transnational bonds seeking out issues upon which they could unite. The decision by the UN to designate 1975 as International Women’s Year and to organize a conference in
Mexico City around the themes of equality, development, and peace, presented anti-war activists of different ideological leanings with an opportunity
to identify common strategic objectives, including disarmament. 134 However,
attempts to place the issue on the main agenda were met with stiff resistance
by States on the grounds that the subject matter would “politicize” women’s
issues. Disarmament, it was maintained, was a matter wholly extraneous and
unrelated to women’s rights. 135 Recognizing that at stake was more than
simply the question of disarmament, but the need to break the cycle of selffulfilling marginalization more broadly, activists from WILPF, the Women’s
International Democratic Federation, and the Jane Addams Peace Association joined forces to convene an event in parallel to the main conference.
Following the event, a joint statement was issued calling for the reallocation
of military budgets to development aid and the “equitable representation of
men and women” in international efforts to further disarmament, including
in the proposed UN Disarmament Conference. 136 As a result of intensive
lobbying by activists, a commitment to “general and complete disarmament”
was incorporated into the final Declaration. 137 Largely due to WILPF’s efforts, disarmament was also integrated into the main agenda in subsequent
134. For a useful overview of the decade, see Irene Tinker & Jane Jaquette, UN Decade
for Women: Its Impact and Legacy, 15 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 419 (1987).
135. This view was also shared by many First World women during the Copenhagen
conference who took the position that political issues detracted from those “common” to
all women. Nilufer Cagatay, Caren Grown & Aida Santiago, The Nairobi Women’s Conference:
Toward a Global Feminism?, 12 FEMINIST STUDIES 401, 403 (1986). See also de Haan, who
offers a damning critique on how “western-oriented feminists, women’s organizations and
scholars, wittingly or not, contributed to and continue to contribute to that process of discursively constructing Western or U.S. hegemony in the field of women’s rights.” Francisca
de Haan & Eugenie Cotton, Pak Chong-ae, and Claudia Jones: Rethinking Transnational Feminism
and International Politics, 25 JOURNAL OF WOMEN’S HISTORY 174, 176 (2013).
136. WILPF, Women’s International Democratic Federation, & Jane Addams Peace
Association, Statement of Findings: International Women’s Year Disarmament Seminar
(May 9, 1975) (on file in the Mildred E. Persinger Collection, Hollins University, Wyndham
Robertson Library, United Nations World Conferences, Mexico, International Women's
Year, IWY 1975: UN: IWY Disarmament Conference).
137. Report of the World Conference of the International Women’s Year, Declaration of
Mexico on the Equality of Women and Their Contribution to Development and Peace, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc.
E/CONF.66/34 (1976).
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conferences held as part of the UN Decade for Women (1976–85) in Copenhagen (1980) and Nairobi (1985). These incremental steps paved the way
for the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, not only to expressly recognize women’s history of activism in calling “for reductions in
military expenditures worldwide, as well as in international trade and trafficking in and the proliferation of weapons,” but to reframe disarmament as
integral to the fulfilment of women’s rights. 138
Albeit non-binding, the Platform for Action reinforces the link between
disarmament and development 139 and commits States to reducing “excessive
military expenditures, trade in arms and investment for arms production and
acquisition” and to “reallocate funds to social and economic development
for the advancement of women.” 140 In short, disarmament was recast as a
means to advance women’s de facto equality with men, a move that was
widely welcomed among activists. That said, the commitment is a modest
one. As Dianne Otto rightly notes, the goal of reducing “excessive” military
expenditure is “qualified to the point of meaninglessness by being made subject to ‘national security considerations’ or ‘legitimate national defence
needs.’” 141
Although forward-looking, the Platform for Action is also a constant
reminder of past State failure to advance disarmament. It does so by recalling
the obligation on States “to work actively towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control” and by urging for
the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty to contribute to
nuclear disarmament, objectives that had been pledged in other international
fora over the preceding decades but not acted upon. By the terms of the
1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), States
were already bound by the legal obligation to advance general and complete

138. Report on the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing Declaration and Platform
for Action, ¶ 138, at 58, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1 (1996) [hereinafter Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action]; see also Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women:
Addendum., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20/Add.1 (Oct. 27, 1995). These documents were
endorsed by G.A. Res. 50/203 (Feb. 23, 1996).
139. For a useful history on UN efforts to link disarmament and development, see
SPIES, supra note 108, ch. 6.
140. See Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, supra note 138, ch. 4, § E (Women and
Armed Conflict).
141. Dianne Otto, Holding up Half the Sky, but for Whose Benefit: A Critical Analysis of the
Fourth World Conference on Women, 6 AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST LAW JOURNAL 7, 24 (1996).
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disarmament. 142 More specifically, Article VI of the NPT requires States to
“pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation
of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on
a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” 143 These three obligations were reaffirmed in the Final
Document of the 1978 Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament 144 and other UN reports endorsed by the General Assembly. Yet,
142. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons art. 6, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T.
483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161. It entered into force on March 5, 1970 and was
extended indefinitely on May 11, 1995. A total of 191 States are Parties, including the five
nuclear-weapon States. Although welcoming the adoption of the treaty, WILPF sent a letter
to the two co-Chairs of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee expressing profound
disappointment that the treaty did not require the nuclear-weapon States to “provide for
speedy measures of effective disarmament.” WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR
PEACE AND FREEDOM, 17TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 74 (1968). The adoption of
the treaty paved way for the UN’s Disarmament Decade (1969–1979).
143. In elaborating on the scope and effect of this obligation, the International Court
of Justice in its advisory opinion stated,
The legal import of that obligation goes beyond that of a mere obligation of conduct; the
obligation involved here is an obligation to achieve a precise result—nuclear disarmament
in all its aspects—by adopting a particular course of conduct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations on the matter in good faith.
This twofold obligation to pursue and to conclude negotiations formally concerns the
182 States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or, in other
words, the vast majority of the international community.
Virtually the whole of this community appears moreover to have been involved when
resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly concerning nuclear disarmament have
repeatedly been unanimously adopted. Indeed, any realistic search for general and complete
disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, necessitates the co-operation of all States.

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶¶
99–100 (July 8).
144. The Final Document states:
The ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and
complete disarmament under effective international control. . . . Progress toward this objective requires the conclusion and implementation of agreements on the cessation of the
arms race and on genuine measure of disarmament. . . .
Among such measures, effective measures of nuclear disarmament . . . have the highest
priority.

G.A. Res. A/RES/S-10/2, ¶¶ 19–20 (June 28, 1978). Although some nuclear-weapon States
have suggested that general and complete disarmament is a precondition to nuclear disarmament, this view is not reflected in the Final Document, nor is it a view shared by the majority
of legal experts.
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despite repeated pronouncements, 145 there were no serious negotiations to
advance disarmament and throughout the Cold War period States continued
to grow their nuclear capabilities, ostensibly to protect national security.
The bilateral and multilateral agreements adopted during the Cold War
period did not secure any reduction in arms nor establish a coherent and
universally applicable “system for the regulation of armaments,” as set forth
in Article 26 of the UN Charter. 146 Rather, what emerged was a fragmented

145. For example, see the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations in which States undertook to “pursue in good faith negotiations for the early conclusion of a universal treaty
on general and complete disarmament.” G.A. Res. 2625, annex, ¶ 1, Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation among States
in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970). Two further Special Sessions on Disarmament were held in 1982 and 1988 but with few outcomes. The
General Assembly has been calling for a fourth session since 1995.
146. See, for example, the UK Ministry of Defence publication “Arms Control and
Security” which stated:
much effort has been put into the arms control process since the Second World War. There
have been some notable successes: the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty [1972]; the interim Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty [1972]; the [1963] Partial Test Ban and [1968] Nuclear NonProliferation Treaties; the [1971] Biological Weapons Convention; and several other lesser
agreement. But despite all efforts, very little has been achieved in the way of actual arms reductions. Most
agreements have either confirmed existing force levels or have been designed to prevent
the development of completely new areas of arms technology.

John Nott, Statement on the Defence Estimates 1982 (Apr. 5, 1982) (on file with The National Archives, Kew, CAB 129/214/9) (emphasis added). This point was emphasized in
the Final Document of the 1978 Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament
which stated:
No real progress has been made so far in the crucial field of reduction of armaments. . . .
Agreements have been reached that have been important in limiting certain weapons or
eliminating them altogether, as in the case of the [biological weapons convention] and excluding particular areas from the arms race. The fact remains that these agreements relate
only to measures of limited restraint while the arms race continues. These partial measures
have done little to bring the world closer to the goal of general and complete disarmament.

G.A. Res. A/RES/S-10/2, supra note 144, ¶ 17.
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body of treaties which operated to advantage the strategic interests of militarily advanced States 147 and, through the notion of non-proliferation, to defer, in perpetuity, the prospect of nuclear disarmament. 148 The disjuncture
between de jure progress and de facto change and the disconnect between
rhetoric and practice extended to women’s equal participation in multilateral
fora concerned with weapons and disarmament. 149 Impervious to normative
change, the field continued to be dominated by men, despite the obligation
of States to take all appropriate measures to ensure women’s equal participation in political life at national and international levels, including in international organizations pursuant to the 1979 Convention on the Elimination

147. Without the support of the United States and the Soviet Union, it is unlikely that
the biological or chemical weapons conventions would have been agreed. Moreover, as
Mathews and McCormack note,
the principal motivation for concluding the [CWC] had less to do with the deleterious consequences of the weapons from a humanitarian point of view, and more to do with other
strategic security factors—most importantly the growing concerns about horizontal proliferation of chemical weapons and the recognition by both the USA and Russia that they did
not need to retain their chemical weapons stockpiles following the Cold War.

Robert J. Mathews & Timothy L.H. McCormack, The Influence of Humanitarian Principles in the
Negotiation of Arms Control Treaties, 81 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 331,
339 (1999).
148. The practice of nuclear-weapon States has been to interpret Article VI of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons narrowly to mean that it contains no
legal requirement to conclude negotiations notwithstanding the pronouncement by the International Court of Justice in its 1996 advisory opinion. See Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226. Legal experts have also been critical of this interpretation,
as exemplified by the 2004 International Law Association report which stated: “the demise
of arms control and disarmament efforts would be contrary to the ICJ advisory opinion,
which has clearly identified an obligation for nuclear-weapon States to pursue in good faith
and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under
strict and effective control.” COMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT LAW,
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, FINAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL
LEGAL REGULATION FOR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ¶ 5 (2004). For an alternative view, see Christopher A. Ford, Debating Disarmament: Interpreting Art. VI of the Treaty on
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 14 NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 401, 403 (2007).
149. The absence of women is indicative of a failure on the part of States to meet
minimum non-discrimination obligations under the Charter and other international human
rights instruments, including the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
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of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). 150 Women continued to remain in the minority and, when included, generally consigned to
positions scripted female with little decision-making power. 151 At the intersection with sex and gender, exclusion founded on race and ethnicity served
to doubly silence and exclude, thereby translating into laws and policies, national and international, that were systematically failing to take account of
women’s lived experiences and, most significantly, their views on what constituted insecurity and how to tackle it.
For anti-war feminists, the Cold War had exposed the extent to which
the age-old forces of militarism and patriarchy—transcending political difference—operated in tandem to exclude alternative voices and to block meaningful progress towards universal disarmament which legal inclusion alone,
even if actualized, could not surmount. 152 After all, the enormous efforts to
dispel State claims around the economic and social costs of general and complete disarmament had delivered no progress; 153 studies on the social and
150. Id. Article 7 of CEDAW states:
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women
in the political and public life of the country and, in particular, shall ensure to women, on
equal terms with men, the right: (a) To vote in all elections and public referenda and to be
eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies; (b) To participate in the formulation of
government policy and the implementation thereof and to hold public office and perform
all public functions at all levels of government; (c) To participate in non-governmental organizations and associations concerned with the public and political life of the country.

Article 8 of CEDAW requires States Parties to “take all appropriate measures to ensure to
women, on equal terms with men and without any discrimination, the opportunity to represent their Governments at the international level and to participate in the work of international organizations.”
151. There were however exceptions. For example, Inga Thorsson, who was UnderSecretary of State at the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the Swedish
Disarmament Delegation to the United Nations, was appointed president of the First NonProliferation Treaty Review Conference in 1976. For an illuminating insight, see the interview with Thorsson. Inga Thorsson, 8 THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY 16, 37 (1986).
152. Feminists had long cautioned that equality would require change “not only in law,
but also in social customs and beliefs.” Margaret Bruce, Work of the United Nations Relating to
the Status of Women, 2 REVUE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME: DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DROIT
COMPARE 365, 365 (1971).
153. By the mid-1960s, macro-economic arguments grounded in Keynesian economics
(that the reduction in public expenditure would translate into high unemployment) had all
but been refuted. The Consultative Group on Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament established pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 1516 had reached the
unanimous conclusion that “all the problems and difficulties of transition connected with
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human cost of weapons were acknowledged but indefinitely postponed; 154
legal arguments dismissed for being non-justiciable; 155 and ideological differences aside, nuclear-weapon States would regularly resort to identical claims
when expedient to do so. 156 For antiwar feminists, it had become all too clear
that only wholescale transformative change would suffice. With elites across
the political spectrum continuing to justify the accumulation of greater and
more destructive stockpiles of weapons on the basis of national security,

disarmament could be met by appropriate national and international measures,” and that
“there should thus be no doubt that the diversion to peaceful purposes of the resources
now in military use could be accomplished to the benefit of all countries and lead to the
improvement of world economic and social conditions.” Quoted in U.N. Secretary-General,
Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament iv, U.N. Doc. E/3593/Rev.1 (1962). The General Assembly subsequently adopted a declaration on the conversion to peaceful needs of
the resources released by disarmament. G.A. Res 1837 (Dec. 18, 1962). Although the General Assembly was to adopt further resolutions on the matter and commission the SecretaryGeneral to undertake further study (see, e.g., Secretary-General, Economic and Social Aspects of
Disarmament, U.N. Doc. E/3898/Rev. 1 (Oct. 7, 1964), reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 1964, at 256 (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ed., 1965)), little
progress materialized. WILPF had long pressed for further studies to highlight the benefits
of reallocating military resources to further social development. See Gertrude Baer, Report on
Work with and at the United Nations 24, 16TH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS, supra note 115.
154. U.N. Secretary-General, Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures, U.N. Doc. A/32/88/Rev.1 (Aug. 12, 1977). See also G.A. Res. 2667 (Dec.
7, 1970); G.A. Res. 2831 (Dec. 16, 1971); G.A. Res. 3075 (Dec. 6, 1973); G.A. Res. 3462
(Dec. 11, 1975).
155. See, e.g., Greenham Women Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, 591 F. Supp. 1332
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). The case involved the deployment of 160 cruise missiles at a Royal Air
Force military base in the United Kingdom. It was dismissed by the court on the grounds
that the issue raised was “a non-justiciable political question.” Id. at 1336. It added that “The
courts are simply incapable of determining the effect of the missile deployment on world
peace.” Id. at 1338.
156. Justifying Soviet nuclear testing in 1961, Premier Khrushchev said:
It is not radioactive fallout that has to be feared but the falling of the actual nuclear weapon.
. . . If you balance the harm of nuclear tests to the health of the people against the consequences of the military application of nuclear weapons, it will be obvious to everyone what
choice has been put before mankind today. . . . The Government of the U.S.S.R. would not
have fulfilled its duty if it did not fittingly look after the security of the Soviet people.

Quoted in Howard J. Taubenfeld, Nuclear Testing and International Law, 16 SOUTHWESTERN
LAW JOURNAL 365, 366 (1962). Likewise, President Kennedy, although “deeply regret[ting]”
additional testing, suggested that it was necessary to balance the risk to health against “the
hazards to hundreds of millions of lives which would be created by any relative decline” in
US nuclear capabilities. Quoted in id. at 366.
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feminist activists and scholars increasingly directed their attention to the systems of power and to the pivotal role of gender in sustaining both militarism
and patriarchy that were, in turn, perpetuating and normalizing the demand
for weapons. 157 The utility and significance of gender as an analytic prism
through which to expose the mechanisms of both militarism and patriarchy,
and as a way in which to dismantle and transform social relations, was not
lost on feminist scholars, notwithstanding diverse ontological and epistemological viewpoints and differences in disciplinary traditions. 158 As an analytic
tool, gender would also provide a supplementary entry point through which
157. See generally CYNTHIA ENLOE, DOES KHAKI BECOME YOU? THE MILITARIZATION
OF WOMEN’S LIVES (1983); CYNTHIA ENLOE, BANANAS, BEACHES AND BASES: MAKING
FEMINIST SENSE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1989). Scales called for militarism and the

structures of militarism to be on the feminist agenda given the “perverse symbiotic relationship between militarism and gender oppression.” Ann Scales, Militarism, Male Dominance and
Law: Feminist Jurisprudence as Oxymoron, 12 HARVARD WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL 25, 26 (1989).
Although some earlier feminist scholarship equated militarism with patriarchy, suggesting
“to be male is synonymous with strength, aggression and the will to dominate and do violence to others,” anti-war feminists were quick to caution against dualist thinking for being
“dangerous” and for disregarding how particular femininities are needed to sustain militarism. Bell Hooks, Feminism and Militarism: A Comment, 23 WOMEN’S STUDIES QUARTERLY
58, 59 (1995). Writing in 1915, Jane Addams too recognized that “the belief that a woman
is against war simply because she is a woman and not a man cannot be substantiated. In
every country there are women who believe that war is inevitable and righteous.” Jane Addams, Women and Internationalism, in WOMEN AT THE HAGUE 128 (1915).
158. “Gender,” as Squires observes, “is a complex and contested concept.” JUDITH
SQUIRES, GENDER IN POLITICAL THEORY 54 (2013). Over the years, gender has been used
in different ways although its origins as a critical prism of analysis can be traced to the
writings of Simone de Beauvoir and her radical insight, articulated in 1949, that “[o]ne is not
born, but rather becomes, woman.” SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 301 (1973).
As Squires notes, de Beauvoir’s existentialist account of social construction “offered a
sweeping critique of biological determinism” creating the intellectual space to distinguish
between sex and gender, with the latter being the cultural interpretation of sex as a biological
category. SQUIRES, supra at 55. Butler argues that this distinction opened the way to “debunk
the claim that anatomy is destiny”; to expose the myth that a binary gender system has no
ontological necessity; to tackle social oppression founded on discrimination; and to transform social interaction. Judith Butler, Sex and Gender in Simone de Beauvoir’s Second Sex, 72
YALE FRENCH STUDIES 35, 35 (1986). Building on these insights, feminist scholarship has
traced the manifold ways in which gender operates to construct identities—individual and
collective—that are contingent on time and location. Other work has explored gender as a
way of structuring relations of power. See, e.g., ANNE SISSON RUNYAN & V. SPIKE PETERSON, GLOBAL GENDER ISSUES IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM (2015). Still others have investigated gender as a symbolic system that functions to shape all aspects of life, including at the
intersection with other axes of oppression, such as race. See BELL HOOKS, AIN’T I A
WOMAN (1981).
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to contest the militarized State-centric conception of security, presenting the
possibility to fundamentally reframe the discourse around weapons.
IV.

REFRAMING

“How then are we to understand your problem, and if we cannot, how can we answer
your question, how to prevent war? The answer based upon our experience and our
psychology—Why fight?—is not an answer of any value.”
Virginia Woolf, 1938 159

By the 1990s there was a growing body of feminist research revealing the
complex ways in which gender worked to shape identities, relations of
power, discourse, the production of knowledge, symbols, material objects,
policy, and law. 160 This work enriched earlier feminist scholarship which had
traced how patriarchy as a form of power privileging male domination operated through gender systems to constitute, order, and shape social and cultural practices and norms. 161 Institutionalized through the law and further
entrenched through the public/private divide, 162 gender systems, it was
159. WOOLF, supra note 10, at 6.
160. On critiquing the objectivity of knowledge production, see, for example, DISCOVERING REALITY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON EPISTEMOLOGY, METAPHYSICS, METHODOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (Sandra Harding & Merril Hintikka eds., 1983).
Feminist historians exploring ways in which gender operated to erase women from history
and how to redress this structural silencing embarked on the political project of writing
women back into history. See, e.g., Joan W. Scott, Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis, 91 THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW 1053 (1986); Joan W. Scott, History and Difference, DAEDALUS, Fall 1987, at 93. International law scholars likewise began to trace the gendered discursive patterns and assumptions within their discipline to account for and explain
the law’s silences to challenge the law’s impartiality. See Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelly Wright, Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 613 (1991). As Gardam notes, “much of the feminist project in law has
been to demonstrate the fallacy of the objectivity of the law, to reveal its underlying assumptions and value judgments as made by, and in the interests of, men.” Judith Gardam, A
Feminist Analysis of Certain Aspects of International Humanitarian Law, 12 AUSTRALIAN YEAR
BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 265, 268 (1992).
161. See, for example, Pateman who reflects on the contested understandings of patriarchy.
CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1991). There is now a significant body of
literature on patriarchy, but for a recent comment on international law and patriarchy, see
Cassandra Mudgway, Smashing the Patriarchy: Why International Law Should Be Doing More, LSE
(Oct. 7, 2019), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/wps/2019/10/07/smashing-the-patriarchy/.
162. Feminists have at least since the eighteenth century questioned the divide between
public and private that has enabled the privileging of the former. MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT,
A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN (1978).
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maintained, function to establish dichotomies to differentiate between male
and female activities and roles and, in that process, create power hierarchies
privileging attributes coded “male” over “female.” 163 These insights exposed
the extent to which gendered norms shape human behavior, interaction, and
value systems that have little or no relationship with sexed bodies and identities and thus provided a richer understanding of the history of women’s
political exclusion as rooted in constructed gender identities and binary systems founded on social and cultural practices contingent on time and location. In other words, gender could not be understood as a static category any
more than gender identities be limited to singular definitions of masculinity
or femininity. 164
In particular, it was the scholarship being generated by feminist international relations scholars who were directing their scrutiny to the gendered
163. While feminist work has detailed how gendered hierarchies are justified by reference to biological/natural determinism by those in power to confer on themselves certain
privileges, other scholars have demonstrated how the very same claims are made to justify
racial hierarchies. Feminists have now long insisted that gender as a category cannot be
abstracted from a particular context since it is always only one component in a matrix of
interrelationships in which other systems of identities and axes of oppression, such as race
and class, operate concurrently. As Bartlett notes:
Although feminists have been guilty of ethnocentrism and all too often fail to recognize
that women's lives are heterogeneous, that women who have had similar experiences may
disagree about political agendas, and that women's gender is only one of many sources of
identity, gender remains a category that can help to analyze and improve our world.

Katharine Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 829, 835 (1990).
164. Feminist scholars have been at pains to stress that patriarchal systems are adept at
spawning different forms and types of masculinities and femininities that dominate, in particular, places and in time. See, e.g., CYNTHIA COCKBURN, ANTIMILITARISM: POLITICAL AND
GENDER DYNAMICS OF PEACE MOVEMENTS (2012); CYNTHIA COCKBURN, FROM WHERE
WE STAND: WAR, WOMEN’S ACTIVISM AND FEMINIST ANALYSIS (2007). In 2010, the
CEDAW Committee elaborated on this relational conception of “gender” to mean
socially constructed identities, attributes and roles for women and men and society’s social
and cultural meaning for these biological differences resulting in hierarchical relationship
between women and men and in the distribution of power and rights favouring men and
disadvantaging women. This social positioning of women and men is affected by political,
economic, cultural, social, religious, ideological and environmental factors and can be
changed by culture, society and community.

Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No 28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties under Article 2 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/GC/28 (Dec. 16, 2010).
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dimensions of global politics, inter-State relations, and war as a system which
opened up new avenues through which to understand the intersection of
patriarchy and militarism. 165 In contrast to mainstream work, feminists
looked to the local as much as the global, revealing how gender operated to
structure and shape relations of power, producing difference and normalizing hierarchies between States and within States, between men and women,
and among men and women in war and peacetime. 166 Most notably, Cynthia
Enloe’s work tracing the ways in which masculinities and femininities were
being manipulated to service militarism 167 and normalize certain forms of
violence, 168 including war, was instrumental in inspiring further work map-

165. See ENLOE, DOES KHAKI BECOME YOU?, supra note 157. See also V. Spike Peterson, Transgressing Boundaries: Theories of Knowledge, Gender, and International Relations, 21 MILLENNIUM: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 183 (1992); J. ANN TICKNER, GENDER IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON ACHIEVING GLOBAL SECURITY (1992); BETTY REARDON, SEXISM AND THE WAR SYSTEM (1985). As with patriarchy,
there is a large body of literature on militarism. For a useful collection of papers by mainstream international relations scholars, see MILITARISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
(Anna Stavrianakis & Jan Selby eds., 2013).
166. What this scholarship was showing was that the ability of States to engage in warfare is contingent on the creation of a “war system”—from training (men) to fight and kill,
to equipping them with the appropriate tools, to channeling resources into research and
development, manufacturing, transport, meeting their individual and collective needs, and
in shaping masculinities (whether as fighter, as administrator, as scientist, as clinician) and
femininities (as colleague, as supporter, as provider) in a manner conducive to war-fighting.
A gender analysis enabled interrogating how masculinities and femininities are constructed
to enable warfare, challenging the claim that men are biologically or naturally war-like. See
also JOSHUA GOLDSTEIN, WAR AND GENDER: HOW GENDER SHAPES THE WAR SYSTEM
AND VICE VERSA (2001).
167. As Enloe notes, “militarization may privilege masculinity, but it does so by manipulating the meanings of both femininity and masculinity.” CYNTHIA ENLOE, MANOEUVRES:
THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF MILITARIZING WOMEN'S LIVES 289 (2000). See also
Riedi, supra note 25, on gender politics and militarism in the context of the Boer War.
168. Over the years the question of “male violence” has been the topic of much study.
As Messner cautions,
the term “male violence” tends to suggest that violence is an essential feature of maleness,
rather than a socially-learned feature of certain kind of masculinity. Indeed, concrete socialscientific examinations of violence show that there is no convincing evidence that men are
genetically or hormonally predisposed to violent behaviour. In fact, the weight of evidence
supports the contention that most males are not comfortable committing acts of violence.
Violent behaviour is learned behaviour, and some men learn it better than others.
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ping how patriarchy linked militarized femininities to militarized masculinities sustaining the domination of certain brands of masculinity that, in turn,
fueled the demand for weapons at personal and inter-State levels. 169
In parallel with this work and under the influence of poststructuralist
theory and the linguistic turn, feminist scholars were exploring how gender
operated in thought, speech, and writing through webs of metaphors, euphemism, and reasoning. This intellectual shift created the potential—
through the disruption, deconstruction, and reconstruction of the discourse
around weapons—to pave the way for a radical change in practice, no more
so than in the sphere of nuclear weapons. In this context, it was Carol Cohn’s
fieldwork that broke new ground, revealing the ways in which the gendered
discourse around nuclear weapons functioned to legitimate and promote the
development, possession, and use of such weapons, posing obstacles to disarmament. 170 Cohn’s work was pivotal in surfacing the gendered language,
concepts, and symbolism prevalent in the nuclear weapons field, including
the manifold ways in which the possession of such weapons systems were
systematically equated with the “attributes” commonly coded masculine, including, for example, strength, sexual virility, rationality, objectivity, and abstraction. 171
Michael Messner, When Bodies are Weapons: Masculinity and Violence in Sport, 25 INTERNA205 (1990).
169. There is a growing body of feminist research engaging with “militarized masculinities,” understood as processes of socialization that are enacted and performed. For a
thoughtful reflection on anti-militarist feminist scholarship in the context of the Security
Council’s Women, Peace and Security agenda, see Hannah Wright, Masculinities Perspectives:
Advancing a Radical Women, Peace and Security Agenda?, 22 INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST JOURNAL OF POLITICS 652 (2020). For an analysis sketching the intimate relationship between
enactments of masculinities and the wielding of weapons, see Henri Myrttinen, Disarming
Masculinities, 4 DISARMAMENT FORUM: WOMEN, MEN, PEACE AND SECURITY 37 (2003).
170. Carol Cohn, Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals, 12 SIGNS 687
(1987). Cohn’s research was undertaken in a period when the nuclear arms race had reached
a level where military superiority no longer had any meaning and when deterrence theory
dominated mainstream scholarship.
171. When India exploded five nuclear devices in May 1998, Hindu nationalist leader
Balasaheb Thackeray stated, “we had to prove that we are not eunuchs.” Quoted in Cohn &
Ruddick, supra note 7, at 19. Likewise, more recently, in a twitter exchange between Donald
Trump and North Korea’s Kim Jong-un, the former tweeted, “I too have a Nuclear Button,
but it is a much bigger & more powerful one than his, and my Button works!” Lauren
Gambino, Donald Trump Boasts That His Nuclear Button Is Bigger Than Kim Jong-un's, GUARDIAN
(Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jan/03/donald-trump-boas
TIONAL REVIEW FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF SPORT 203,
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Uncovering the gendered symbolic value and meaning attached to weapons was seen as a critical step towards challenging the underlying rationale
that sustained the valorization of weapons, most notably nuclear. A gender
analysis not only revealed how the possession of nuclear weapons was intimately conjoined with militarized masculinities wielding a powerful symbolic
value in the construction of the role of men in society from the local to the
global level but the extent to which the gendered discourse facilitated the
development and use of nuclear weapons. 172 Clinical, technical, formulaic, abstract, and detached language, again coded masculine, permeated the nuclear
weapons field—whether among political elites or those engaged in the development of such weapons—making it possible to subordinate consideration of, or to elide, the material, experienced, and corporal consequences of
their use. In short, the gendered discourse turned what should have been the
unthinkable into a rational prospect. 173
For anti-war feminist scholars, unraveling the gendered symbolic value
of weapons, their intimate association with, and pivotal part in constructing,
patriarchal power and models of militarized masculinities and femininities
was a critical step toward securing transformative change. Recognizing weapons as more than simply the tools through which coercive power and violence was applied but deconstructing the co-constitutive relationship between weapons and gender opened up the possibility of developing meaningful counter-strategies to dismantle the obstacles to disarmament. Thus, in
contrast to mainstream scholarship which continued to fall back on the ageold claim that “[men] do not fight because they have arms. They have arms
because they deem it necessary to fight” 174—admitting no room to surmount
ts-nuclear- button-bigger-kim-jong-un. For anti-war feminists, these overtly sexualized public pronouncements and exchanges served to reinforce feminist analyses pointing to the
pivotal role of gender in perpetuating the demand for nuclear weapons. The essence of
masculinity could be defined and measured by the possession of the ultimate weapon of
destruction.
172. Carol Cohn, Felicity Hill & Sara Ruddick, The Relevance of Gender for Eliminating
Weapons of Mass Destruction (The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission Paper No. 38
(2006)), https://genderandsecurity.org/sites/default/files/the_relevance_of_gender_for_
eliminating_weapons_of_mass_destruction_-_cohn_hill_ruddick.pdf.
173. Cohn, supra note 170, at 715.
174. HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR
POWER AND PEACE 115 (1967). Throughout the Cold War period, mainstream scholarship,
most notably the field of International Relations and Security Studies, was dominated by the
realist school and later by the emergence of neorealist approaches. The dominance of this
school was probably what Alva Myrdal had in mind when, in referring to the industrial-
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the stalemate—feminist scholarship provided an alternative entry point to
reframe and rejuvenate the disarmament debate and, at the same time, to
inform and shape the trajectory of feminist activism.
As with other critical traditions, anti-war scholars have also been critical
of the political strategy of non-proliferation, most notably in its existing application to nuclear weapons. 175 That the effect of the regime as elaborated
in the NPT is to legitimize the possession of nuclear weapons by the original
nuclear-weapon States and to sanction, by default, a deviation from the principle of sovereign equality, thereby normalizing a hierarchy 176 further entrenched through international law is a common criticism. 177 Feminist scholarship has taken this critique one step further to expose the extent to which
military complex, she added “academic.” MYRDAL, supra note 119. See also Hans J. Morgenthau, Does Disarmament Mean Peace?, in ARMS AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE
417, 422 (Milton L. Rakove ed., 1972). Bull likewise reasons that the competition for arms
is a function of the competition for power and “a mutually satisfactory settlement of the
power contest is a precondition for disarmament.” He continues, “the fact that the arms
race contributes to political tension does not diminish the difficulty that it cannot be brought
to an end without the ending of this tension.” Hedley Bull, Disarmament and the International
System, in THEORIES OF PEACE AND SECURITY: A READER IN CONTEMPORARY STRATEGIC
THOUGHT 138 (John Garnett ed., 1970).
175. Non-proliferation is a term dating back to the Cold War that is understood to
apply to weapons of mass destruction—chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear—
rather than conventional weapons. Developed as a strategy that sought to maintain the status quo and the extant balance of power, non-proliferation, as a standalone concept, does
not entail the reduction in weapons and implicitly allows for a distinction to be made between legal and illegal possession and use.
176. As White points out, this hierarchical stratification of power is duplicated in other
conventions such as the Genocide Convention (which extends to the members of the Security Council the authority to decide on whether genocide was being committed) and the
Rome Statute (empowering the Security Council to refer and defer cases). See Nigel White,
Understanding Nuclear Deterrence Within the International Constitutional Architecture, in 5 NUCLEAR
NON-PROLIFERATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL CHALLENGES FOR NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND SECURITY 107 (Jonathan L. Black-Branch & Dieter Fleck eds., 2020).
177. The NPT is often referred to be a “grand bargain” between nuclear-weapon States
and non-nuclear-weapon States and to that extent parallels the unequal distribution of
power upon which the UN Charter is founded. The deviation from equality was agreed to,
ostensibly on the basis that the nuclear-weapon States are to be trusted with such privileges
in exchange for security, although the paradox is that it was the policies of the permanent
members of the Security Council which increased international insecurity through the arms
race. Although the United Kingdom has tellingly described the NPT as “the most widely
adhered to arms control treaty in history” it is difficult to see how such a conclusion can be
arrived at in light of the obligations set forth in the treaty and the practice of States. Briefing

886

Transformative Disarmament

Vol. 97

the discourse is steeped in gendered rhetoric. As Carol Cohn and Sara Ruddick maintain, it is not uncommon for the permanent members of the Security Council to be depicted as the protectors of security, always rational, objective, responsible, technologically advanced, and coded masculine versus
non-nuclear-weapon States that are portrayed either as in need of protection
or irrational, emotional, irresponsible, and technologically backward and oftentimes coded feminine. 178 These narratives have, in turn, become the basis
for consolidating the status quo. Through their scholarship, Claire Duncanson and Catherine Eschle have likewise highlighted the ways in which nuclear-weapon States have persistently invoked a gendered rhetoric to justify
the retention of nuclear capabilities, albeit one that relies on redefined masculinities in a post-Cold War environment. 179
The changing nature of armed violence that unfolded with the end of
the Cold War drew in a new generation of feminists scholars whose focus
has been primarily on small arms and light weapons (SALW), corresponding
to a shift in attention within the UN system from weapons of mass destruction to the proliferation of SALW. 180 This research traced the gender dimensions of SALW to show how their proliferation was giving rise to different
and disproportionate insecurities for women and girls, most especially in
notes of March 8, 1996 from the Ministry of Defence to the office of the Prime Minister
(on file with The National Archives, Kew, PREM 19/6222). Although nuclear-weapon
States have continued to maintain that pursuant to the NPT they are legally entitled to possess nuclear weapons, their obligation is to work towards the elimination of their weapons,
a requirement that was strengthened at the 2000 NPT Review Conference with the commitment to “an unequivocal undertaking . . . to accomplish the total elimination of their
nuclear arsenals.” 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document: Review of the Operation of the Treaty, Taking into
Account the Decisions and the Resolution Adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference 14,
U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II) (2000).
178. Carol Cohn & Sara Ruddick, A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction, in ETHICS AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, supra note 7, at 405.
179. Duncanson & Eschle, supra note 7. In the cyber world, it is the “techno geek” who
is central to the redefined conception of masculinity.
180. By 1995, the UN’s attention and resources were shifting from weapons of mass
destruction to the proliferation of SALW and anti-personnel landmines in the context of
non-international armed conflict. The need for greater regulation of anti-personnel
landmines was also a matter being addressed by States, albeit, in the view of many, inadequately, in the context of the Convention on Certain Convention Weapons. Report of the
Secretary-General, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace 14: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on
the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1 (Jan.
25, 1995).
887

International Law Studies

2021

post-conflict environments; 181 that the proliferation of SALW and with it the
creation of weaponized cultures were a product of, and reinforce, patriarchal
hierarchies and militarism; and that, as with weapons of mass destruction,
SALWs are “the embodiment of violent, often militarized models of masculinity.” 182 Importantly, this research questioned the traditional distinction between war and peace and conceptions of security wedded to the territorial
State which was failing to capture the everyday violence that women were
experiencing in weaponized societies.
In parallel with this work, feminist international relations scholars were
tracing the links between inter-State security and gendered insecurities “to
draw attention to the extent to which gender hierarchies themselves [were] a
source of domination and thus an obstacle to a truly comprehensive definition of security.” 183 Feminist scholars were not alone in urging for a more
expansive understanding of security that placed the individual’s security at
the core of the inquiry rather than simply the security of the State. 184 While
earlier iterations of “human security” can be traced to renewed efforts during
the early 1980s by the UN to press for the redirection of resources from
military expenditure to development, 185 it was the 1994 Human Develop-

181. For example, see the 2011 Secretary-General’s report on women, peace and security, which states, “gender-based violence is more prevalent and more severe when guns are
readily available.” U.N. Secretary-General, Women and Peace and Security, ¶ 39, U.N. Doc.
S/2011/598 (Sept. 29, 2011). See also GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES, GENEVA, SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2014: WOMEN AND GUNS (2014).
182. Henri Myrttinen, Disarming Masculinities, 4 DISARMAMENT FORUM: WOMEN, MEN,
PEACE AND SECURITY 37, 41 (2003).
183. TICKNER, supra note 165, at 53. Scholars asked whether social organizations—not
least the State—were capable of delivering on an authentic meaningful security if they were
founded on relationships of domination and subordination, whether by gender, race, or
class. Feminist activists had, at least since the UN Decade of Women, questioned the narrow, militarized State-centric conception of security. See, e.g., Inga Thorsson, Disarmament
and Development, WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, 23RD INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS (1986).
184. The discourse around security “would appear to have colonized our minds and to
have subjugated other ways of understandings relations among states.” Carol Cohn, Emasculating America’s Linguistic Deterrent, in ROCKING THE SHIP OF STATE 154 (Adrienne Harris
et al. eds., 1989).
185. Proposals for linking disarmament with development have been aired since the
1950s, prompted largely by the General Assembly pursuant to its mandate under Article 26
of the Charter:
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ment Report that catapulted the idea of “human security” onto the international agenda, injecting new life into antiwar scholarship and activism. 186 In
particular, the report called for a change in the concept of security from an
exclusive stress on State security to a much greater stress on people’s security, from security through armaments to security through human development, and from territorial security to food, employment, and environmental
security. This re-conceptualization of security not only served as the theo-

In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security
with the least diversion for armament of the world’s human and economic resources, the
Security Council shall be responsible for formulating . . . plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

However, it was the increase in military expenditure in comparison to gross national product
growth among Third World countries during the 1970s and 1980s that prompted renewed
interest in the linkage and that shaped the thematic direction of the disarmament debate,
paralleling the broader international focus on development. See also supra notes 153 and 154.
The General Assembly held two special sessions on Disarmament and Development (1978
and 1982) and convened an international conference in 1987. See International Conference
on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, Report of the Conference, ¶ 22,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.130/39 (Sept. 22, 1987). During this period, WILPF also continued
to actively link disarmament and development, with the difference that activists advocated
for the reallocation of resources to be targeted to measures to address gender inequality. See
WILPF’s twentieth international congress in 1977 on the theme of “Disarmament and Development, Women’s Priority: Building a World Without Weapons or Want.” WOMEN’S
INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, 20TH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS (1977). As the WHO had done so in the early 1950s in respect of nuclear weapons,
throughout the Cold War period international financial institutions recused themselves from
discussions pertaining to arms reduction for being a “sensitive and political” issue. DEVESH
KAPUR, JOHN LEWIS, & RICHARD WEBB, THE WORLD BANK: ITS FIRST HALF CENTURY
533 (1997).
186. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1994: NEW DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN SECURITY (1994). The report noted that notwithstanding the decline in global military spending between 1987 and 1994 the reductions
in military spending had not been redirected towards human development. For a critical
reflection on the concept of human security, see CHRISTINE CHINKIN & MARY KALDOR,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND NEW WARS ch. 11 (2017).
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retical foothold for the emergence of the idea of “humanitarian disarmament” 187 but in that process brought together different constituencies of actors, including anti-war feminists, to unite to work towards advancing those
shared goals. 188
For anti-war feminists, the concept of humanitarian disarmament presented an opportunity to contest and reshape international law’s trajectory
as introduced at the 1899 Peace Conference when, much to the disappointment of feminist peace activists, the failure to advance disarmament had instead paved the way for the development of IHL. Anti-war feminists have
for the most part remained skeptical of IHL’s potential to “protect” 189 let
alone further disarmament, even partial, given that its primary concern is to
regulate the use of weapons in war through the two “cardinal” principles of
IHL, distinction and unnecessary suffering. 190 Distinction, which translates
187. At the international level, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
helped to reposition debates within a human security framework by launching a project in
2004 on “Disarmament as Humanitarian Action: Making Multilateral Negotiations Work.”
For a useful analysis on the history of and thinking on humanitarian disarmament, see Bonnie Docherty, Ending Civilian Suffering: The Purpose, Provisions, and Promise of Humanitarian Disarmament Law, 15 AUSTRIAN REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL & EUROPEAN LAW 7 (2010);
Richard Slade, Robert Tickner & Phoebe Wynn-Pope, Protecting Humanity from the Catastrophic
Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons: Reframing the Debate Towards the Humanitarian
Impact, 97 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 731 (2015).
188. The 1899 Peace Conference may have paved the way for a wholly new model of
civil society engagement in the shaping of international law, but humanitarian disarmament
has given rise to a new model of treaty-making involving coalitions of international non-governmental organizations and like-minded States working together to secure new treaties to
ban landmines and cluster munitions. Thus, in contrast to earlier models where international
non-governmental organizations lobbied States to initiate and secure changes in law, this
new model is grounded in law-making from the margins to the center. In other words, the
line between influencing the content and direction of law and the power to create law has
been disrupted.
189. See, for example, the Statement by the Disarmament Committee, supra note 73
(“We have no belief in the possibility of humanising warfare nor defending civilian populations . . . from modern methods of waging war.”).
190. The principle of unnecessary suffering is traced to the St. Petersburg Declaration,
which condemned the use of weapons “which uselessly aggravate the suffering of disabled
men, or render their death inevitable.” Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of
Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29/Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol.
T.S. 297, 18 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 1) 474. The International Court of Justice described these two principles as “cardinal” in its 1996 advisory opinion. Legality of the Threat
or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 78 (July 8). For a feminist
critical analysis, see Judith Gardam, The Silences in the Rules that Regulate Women during Times of
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into the principle of discrimination in assessing the lawfulness of a weapon
per se, may have played some part in prohibiting chemical and biological
weapons, 191 but, for critical feminists, its inadequacy was laid bare in respect
of nuclear weapons. 192 Moreover, feminist critique was hampered by the fact
that the principle of unnecessary suffering—the measure by which weapons
could be deemed lawful or not—was understood to apply exclusively to the
effects of weapons on combatants on the basis that IHL prohibits attacks
on the civilian population by virtue of the principle of distinction. 193 The
paradox was that IHL’s dichotomized structure and mode of reasoning functioned to suppress consideration of its stated ambition—humanitarian protection. More generally, feminist legal scholars remained reticent to engage
with IHL given its agnosticism towards the practice of collective violence
and an anxiety that, by integrating gender into the fabric of the law, the legitimacy of resorting to violence in the first place would be reinforced, albeit
indirectly.
Armed Conflict, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GENDER AND CONFLICT (Fionnuala Ni Aolain
et al., eds. 2018).
191. Humanitarian concerns have not as a rule been the primary motivation for States
to further arms control. See Mathews & McCormack, supra note 147.
192. See the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion on the legality of nuclear
weapons, where the court could only conclude that “the threat or use of nuclear weapons
would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict,
and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.” Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 105(2)(E).
193. This interpretation is supported by the text of the relevant provisions in the treaties, State practice, and the ICRC. The origins of the prohibition on weapons that cause
“superfluous injury” or “unnecessary suffering” date to the agreements entered into by
States attending the 1899 Peace Conference. Article 23(e) of the regulations annexed to the
1899 Hague Convention II prohibits the use of “arms, projectiles, or material of a nature to
cause superfluous injury.” Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land
art. 23(e), annexed to Convention No. II with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403. The prohibition was reaffirmed at the
second Peace Conference with the adoption of the 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land. Article 22 states “the right of belligerents to adopt
means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited,” while Article 23 prohibits the use of “poison
or poisoned weapons” and “arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary
suffering.” Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land arts. 22, 23,
annexed to Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539. The prohibition was once again codified in the form of
Article 35(2) of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Protocol Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts art. 35(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
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By contrast, anti-war feminists have embraced humanitarian disarmament as a concept and method. On a conceptual level, it introduced the possibility to consider the impact of weapons on all persons (irrespective of status) at all times (thereby disrupting the oftentimes unhelpful distinction between peace and armed conflict), and draws on both IHL and international
human rights law, the latter being a body of law far more aligned with feminist conceptions of protection. 194 Rather than asking whether a weapon can
distinguish between lawful and unlawful targets, the inquiry shifted attention
to the effects of the weapon. As a method, it unsettled traditional ideas
around the making of international law as a right exclusively confined to
States, thereby dispersing power. 195 Feminist support for humanitarian disarmament proved to be well-placed. Reframing the inquiry culminated in the
adoption of the 1997 Ottawa Treaty banning anti-personnel mines 196 and the
2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions. 197 And it was the recognition by
States in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference of “the
catastrophic humanitarian consequence of any use of nuclear weapons” that
paved the way for further discussions on the humanitarian impact of nuclear
weapons to be aired over the course of following years, resulting in the adoption of the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. 198
Although feminist scholarship had long maintained that weapons create
and exacerbate gendered insecurities, the concept of humanitarian disarmament opened up the possibility for researchers to further interrogate the gendered effects of specific weapons, spawning an increasing body of evidence
documenting the different and often disproportionate adverse effects that

194. For example, instead of inquiring whether the weapon can be deployed in a manner to distinguish between lawful and unlawful targets, humanitarian disarmament directs
attention to the material effects of specific weapons on the population across an extended
temporal period. It could be argued that the effect of this reasoning is to extend the prohibition of superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering to the civilian population.
195. ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2007).
196. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Sept. 17, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211.
197. Convention on Cluster Munitions, May 30, 2008, 2688 U.N.T.S. 39.
198. Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, July 7, 2017, 57 INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL MATERIALS 347 (2018) (entered into force Jan. 22, 2021).
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specific categories of weapons have on women due to their sex and gender. 199 Studies on the effects of nuclear weapons—from their use in wartime
to testing in peacetime—exposed both the particular harms caused to
women and girls due to their sex, 200 as well as the disproportionate adverse
harms that result due to their gender. 201 Research has been undertaken in
respect of conventional weapons and similar findings documented. 202 The

199. For example, SEXED PISTOLS: THE GENDERED IMPACTS OF SMALL ARMS AND
LIGHT WEAPONS (Vanessa A. Farr et al. eds., 2009). See also GENDER PERSPECTIVES ON
SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS: REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS

(Vanessa A. Farr & Kiflemariam Gebre-Wold eds., 2002). What much of this research revealed was the siloed approach that had hitherto been adopted by States in developing strategies to regulate arms failed to consider the gendered dimensions of weapons. As Farr observes, “although weapons proliferation is often culturally sanctioned and upheld by the
manipulation of gender ideologies, gender goes entirely unremarked in all documents which
were not explicitly conceived to focus on gender mainstreaming.” Vanessa A. Farr, A Gendered Analysis of International Agreement on Small Arms and Light Weapons, in id. at 17.
200. For examples of scientific studies on the physical and mental health impact of
nuclear weapons, see INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY INSTITUTE & UNITED NATIONS
INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, GENDER, DEVELOPMENT AND NUCLEAR
WEAPONS ch. 3 (2016). Studies cited found that the risk of developing and dying from solid
cancer due to ionizing radiation exposure was nearly twice as high for women as for men
who survived the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with many women dying from breast
cancer. Evidence documenting the effects of nuclear weapons on pregnant women, in particular, is hugely disturbing. See, for example, the testimony of Lijon Eknilang of Rongelap
Atoll in the Marshall Islands case before the International Court of Justice:
Women on the island . . . have given birth to babies that look like blobs of jelly. Some of
these things we carry for eight months, nine months. There are no legs, no arms, no head,
no nothing. Other children are born who will never recognize this world or their own parents. They just lie there with crooked arms and legs and never speak. Already we have seven
such children.

Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and
to Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. U.K.), Verbatim Record, ¶ 10, https://www.icjcij.org/public/files/case-related/160/160-20160311-ORA-01-00-BI.pdf.
201. Anne G. Dimmen, Gendered Impacts: The Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons
from a Gender Perspective (International Law and Policy Institute-UN Institute for Disarmament Research Paper No. 5 (2014)).
202. Empirical research consistently shows that while men and boys generally make up
the majority of victims, women and girls experience different and often disproportionate
harms. For example, studies have shown that females injured by landmines are less likely to
have access to immediate health care and therefore more likely to die from serious injuries.
Stella Salvagni Varó & Ciro Hamo, Post-conflict Recovery: Gender and Age Issues, 17 THE JOUR-
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reframing of the inquiry, which has enabled the traditional limitations of time
and space to be overcome in assessing the impact of weapons, is an approach
more closely aligned with feminist critical scholarship, which has long been
troubled by the fracturing of reality constituted by policy and law. 203 The
dichotomized structure of policy, entrenched principally through public international law and IHL, was failing to capture the complex gendered effects
of weapons that were both particular (contingent on time and space) and
universal (producing common patterns of gendered harm). By contrast, humanitarian disarmament enabled the realization that for very many women
and girls, the harmful effects of weapons—from nuclear to SALW—are oftentimes no less significant in peacetime nor, for that matter, in the private
realm. The effects are simply different. Likewise, for feminist legal scholars,
humanitarian disarmament’s grounding in international human rights law
provided the potential to raise alternative perspectives that had hitherto been
suppressed, require States to consider the human cost of use and, importantly,
introduce an additional legal route through which States could be held responsible for their actions and omissions in the field of arms control.
The advancements secured through humanitarian disarmament have
been greater than originally anticipated. However, by definition, there is a
limit to what can be achieved since to focus on the effects of a weapon is to
risk losing sight of the forces that propel the demand for weapons. The
champions of humanitarian disarmament rely on stigmatizing the weapon to
address demand, 204 but this strategy has also resulted in entrenching the extant parallel approaches to disarmament, each side more convinced of its
own reasoned position. What has been surfaced through this parallel process
are the unshakeable bonds that exist among and between those States that
have invested in weapons, transcending all other disagreements. 205 Those
NAL OF ERW AND MINE ACTION

32 (2013). Gender analyses have also been critical in designing and delivering appropriate support for victims as is now required by the terms of
the conventions adopted under humanitarian disarmament.
203. As Scales elaborates, “a feminist theory and practice attempts to account for the
fracturing of reality, and then to make reality whole again.” Scales, supra note 157, at 52.
204. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons describes itself as the
“international campaign to stigmatise, prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons.” See ICAN,
https://www.icanw.org/ (last visited May 21, 2021).
205. For example, see the Joint Statement on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, released by the permanent five members of the Security Council on October 24, 2018:
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bonds are the bonds of patriarchy and militarism. Feminist engagements
with and support for humanitarian disarmament as a strategy is likely to continue, although it is a strategy that falls short of universal and total disarmament, the ambition that was embraced by feminist peace activists a century
ago. Moreover, in an age when extraordinary levels of harm—material and
otherwise—can be inflicted without the use of a weapon and weapon system
as such, humanitarian disarmament, which is concerned with the effects of
a weapon, is likely to have little reach. 206
Although initially marginalized, feminist analyses have increasingly come
to the attention of mainstream policy-shapers in the disarmament field who
have begun to recognize the potential that a gender analysis can provide to
further disarmament. 207 For example, in his Agenda for Disarmament, the UN
Secretary-General recommends,
all States should also incorporate gender perspectives in the development
of national legislation and policies on disarmament and arms control, including consideration of the gendered aspects of ownership, use and misuse of arms; the differentiated impacts of weapons on women and men;

[W]e reiterate our opposition to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. We
firmly believe that the best way to achieve a world without nuclear weapons is through a
gradual process that takes into account the international security environment. This proven
approach to nuclear disarmament has produced tangible results, including deep reductions
in the global stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

Press Release, UK Government, P5 Joint Statement on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/p5-jointstatement-on-the-treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons.
206. Jeffrey Biller & Michael Schmitt, Classification of Cyber Capabilities and Operations as
Weapons, Means, or Methods of Warfare, 95 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 179 (2019).
207. A report released by the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission in 2006 noted
how feminist research had “rightly observed that armament policies and the use of armed
forces have often been influenced by misguided ideas about masculinity and strength. An
understanding of and emancipation from this traditional perspective might help to remove
some of the hurdles on the road to disarmament and non-proliferation.” THE WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION COMMISSION, WEAPONS OF TERROR: FREEING THE WORLD OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL ARMS 160 (June 1, 2006). The Commission’s report
was informed by Carol Cohn, Felicity Hill, and Sara Ruddick’s work, The Relevance of Gender
for Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction, supra note 172, as was the UN Institute for Disarmament Research’s 2016 publication, Gender, Development and Nuclear Weapons, supra note
200.
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and the ways in which gender roles can shape arms control and disarmament policies and practices. 208

Feminist scholarship and activism have made significant inroads in shaping
policy and law-making at domestic and international levels in the course of
the last three decades and “gender” is now integral to the mainstream lexicon. 209 Yet, notwithstanding such breakthroughs, anti-war feminists remain
208. The need to take account of the gender dimensions of weapons was very much
integral to the speech delivered by the Secretary-General when launching the report:
And there is also a strong gender dimension to this work. Almost universally, guns are
infused with masculine characteristics. Men make up the overwhelming majority of the
owners and users of firearms. Women are several times more likely to be victims of gun
violence than perpetrators. The presence of excessive and unregulated firearms exacerbates
gender-based violence and shores up traditional gender roles and power relations. We must
prevent a culture of violence and bloodshed, and a cycle that is difficult to break.

Guterres, supra note 1. Feminist activists are engaged in important work in the area of SALW
and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. For example, see CHRISTINE
BUTEGWA, GENDER PERSPECTIVES IN ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT: VIEWS FROM
AFRICA (2020). However, this work is primarily, if not exclusively, concerned with addressing the proliferation of weapons among non-State actors. As such, there is a risk that integrating this within the Women, Security and Peace agenda as “arms control and disarmament” will detract attention from the more radical feminist agenda of calling for universal
disarmament of States.
209. Gender mainstreaming has been official UN policy since 1997 with the adoption
of the Economic and Social Council’s Agreed Conclusions stressing the need to incorporate
gender perspectives into all areas of the UN’s work. Economic & Social Council, Coordination of Policies and Activities of the Specialized Agencies and Other Bodies of the United
Nations System Related to the Following Theme: Mainstreaming the Gender Perspective
into All Policies and Programmes in the United Nations System, U.N. Doc. E/1997/L.30
(July 14, 1997). Gender mainstreaming can be traced to women’s activism in the early 1990s
and the campaign to mainstream issues of women’s rights and gender equality into the international system as a technique to overcome the problem of marginalization. Mainstreaming was first endorsed at the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights and reaffirmed in 1995 at the Beijing World Conference on Women. For feminist activists, the use
of the term “gender” as distinct from “sex” by the multilateral institutions represented a
huge breakthrough since gender expressed the reality that women’s and men’s roles and
status are socially and culturally constructed rather than biologically determined and therefore could be changed. See the Secretary-General’s report, Integrating the Gender Perspective into the Work of United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies, which states,
the term “gender” refers to the socially constructed roles of women and men that are ascribed to them on the basis of their sex, in public and in private life. The term “sex” refers
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skeptical that the current trajectory will deliver fundamental change, not least
since “gender” is still equated to “women” by too many and “gender mainstreaming” treated as an after-thought rather than a perspective that informs
both the inquiry and solution. In addition, there remains an ever-present
anxiety that gender mainstreaming, as Anne Orford cautions, “may mean
that feminism ends up simply facilitating the existing projects and priorities
of militarised economic globalization in the name of protecting and promoting the interests of women.” 210
Such fears are not unwarranted. Feminist legal scholars and activists may
have played an active role in pressing for the integration of human rights and
a novel provision on gender-based violence into the text of the 2013 Arms
Trade Treaty, 211 but they nonetheless remained acutely aware of the downsides entailed in supporting a treaty that sought “to stop irresponsible arms
trade or transfers.” 212 As with the nuclear non-proliferation discourse, the
distinction between lawful and unlawful weapons—a distinction that generally corresponds not to the weapon per se but to the status of the weapon
bearer—has the twin effect of legitimizing the weapons-bearing State actor
as well as the weapon itself. The Arms Trade Treaty may have been widely
celebrated among the humanitarian community for furthering arms control,
but critical feminists bemoaned the fact that what it concurrently does is to
leave untouched the lawful trade in arms, diverting attention from the fact
to the biological and physical characteristics of women and men. Gender roles are contingent on a particular socio-economic, political and cultural context, and are affected by other
factors, including age, race, class and ethnicity. Gender roles are learned, and vary widely
within and between cultures. As social constructs, they can change.

U.N. Secretary-General, Integrating the Gender Perspective into the Work of United Nations Human
Rights Treaty Bodies, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. HRI/MC/1998/6 (Sept. 3, 1998).
210. Anne Orford, Feminism, Imperialism and the Mission of International Law, 71 NORDIC
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 275, 283 (2002).
211. Arms Trade Treaty, Apr. 2, 2013, 52 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 988
(2013). Article 7(4) makes it mandatory for States Parties to take into account the risk of
“serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children” in their risk assessment processes for transferring conventional weapons, ammunition, parts, or components. The recognition that there is a link between the proliferation in
small arms/transfers in arms and gender-based violence in war and peacetime is a step forward. However, in addition to the problem identified in the text above, there is also the risk
that such a provision perpetuates the depiction of women solely as potential victims.
212. Peter Maurer, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Statement delivered at the First Conference of the States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty (Aug.
24, 2015), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/first-conference-states-parties-arms-tradetreaty-att.
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that the global arms trade has and continues to be dominated by the permanent members of the Security Council. 213
Such paradoxes are ones that anti-war feminists, in particular, struggle
with, 214 leading them to repeatedly question the wisdom of engaging with
existing frameworks that, by definition, appear to preclude transformation,
making engagement futile, if not dangerous. After all, feminist scholarship
has exposed how extant systems and structures of power, including international law itself, are founded on relations of domination and coercion that
are reproduced through the construction of difference, sustained and normalized by false binaries and dualistic reasoning. This, in turn, begs the question as to whether feminist theory is condemned to perpetual disappointment and, relatedly, whether productive principled critique is only possible
from the margins. The benefits of strategic cooperation—whether with likeminded States, the humanitarian community, or indeed with fellow feminists
with different philosophical standpoints and priorities—may be significant,
but anti-war feminists have long recognized that there are always costs to be
reckoned with, even when collaborating with partners. 215
Feminist critical engagements with weapons and disarmament have provided valuable insights on the workings of patriarchy and militarism through
gender regimes and of the complex ways in which gender functions to ascribe meaning to weapons beyond their material form which, in turn, fuel
demand. In parallel, feminist scholars have expended considerable energy
countering false narratives that equate weapons with security, not least the
claim repetitively voiced by nuclear-weapon States that such weapons contribute to peace and security. 216 Although this work is finding its way into policy
213. This does not mean that critical feminist scholars oppose the Arms Trade Treaty
but simply that feminist engagements with international law are never without problems. See
also Maurer, id. The advantages of having such a treaty are enormous, not least since it creates
opportunities to hold governments to account whether through advocacy or through litigation. That said, the terms of the treaty have been drafted in a manner that does not make
litigation easy. See, e.g., CAAT’S Legal Challenge, CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARMS TRADE,
https://caat.org.uk/homepage/stop-arming-saudi-arabia/caats-legal-challenge/ (last visited May 21, 2021).
214. The paradox of law reform strategies is that in insisting on the inclusion of
measures that take account of the specificity of women, sexual difference is reintroduced.
215. Carol Cohn, Mainstreaming Gender in UN Security Policy: A Path to Political Transformation? 12 (Boston Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights Working Paper No.
204
(2004)),
https://genderandsecurity.org/sites/default/files/mainstreaming_gender_in_un_security_policy-_a_path_to_political_transformation_0.pdf.
216. See, for example, the draft statement by the UK Secretary of State for Defence:
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and law-making, there remains a deep reluctance not only among States but
non-governmental partners and fellow academics 217 to fully embrace a gender analysis. Not to do so is, by default, to accept an eclipsed view and to
forsake an opportunity to secure transformative sustainable change.
V.

TRANSFORMATION

Did men say, “After you, sir” as to disarmament? If so, let us women say, “Follow
me.”
Gertrud Baer, 1924 218

In describing the present architecture of arms control law as “fragmented”
and lamenting the fact that no “system for the regulation of armaments” as
set forth in Article 26 of the UN Charter has been developed, mainstream
international legal scholars have called for a “more coherent approach” to
rejuvenate arms control and disarmament, including adopting a framework
treaty on arms regulation with specific treaties, protocols, codes of conduct,
and other implementation instruments providing necessary detail. 219 That

The Prime Minister, when replying to a letter from Mr Gorbachev about the Soviet proposals of January 1986, made clear the Government’s view that nuclear weapons at present
make an essential contribution to preserving peace and stability and that East and West will
continue to rely on them in their deterrent role for the foreseeable future.

George Younger, UK Secretary of State for Defence, Draft Statement on the Defence Estimates 1986, ¶ 212 (Mar. 26, 1986) (on file with The National Archives, Kew, CAB
129/221/4). This rationale normalizes and explains the dominance of the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence, which has been castigated by anti-war feminists for being nothing
other than “a fiction.” Cohn & Ruddick, supra note 178, at 15–16. There is now a considerable body of academic literature unpacking the concept of nuclear deterrence. See, e.g., Nigel,
supra note 176, at 254–58; Stuart Casey-Maslen, The Status of Nuclear Deterrence Under International Law in Light of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, 21 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 23 (2018); Anne Harrington, Power, Violence, and Nuclear
Weapons, 4 CRITICAL STUDIES ON SECURITY 91 (2016); GEORGE SCHULTZ & JAMES
GOODBY, THE WAR THAT MUST NEVER BE FOUGHT. DILEMMAS OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE (2015); MICHAEL QUINLAN, THINKING ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS: PRINCIPLES,
PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS (2009).
217. COMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT LAW, supra note 148, at 12.
218. 4TH CONGRESS REPORT, supra note 59, at 111.
219. COMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT LAW, supra note 148, at 12.
See also Dieter Fleck, Arms Control and Disarmament Law: Its Role in Addressing New Security
Threats, 52 MILITARY LAW AND THE LAW OF WAR REVIEW 61 (2013).
899

International Law Studies

2021

arms control and disarmament law is a fragmented body of law is hardly
surprising.
Multilateral institutional bodies may have been accorded the right—or
indeed the responsibility—to develop systems for the regulation of armaments, but States have repeatedly ensured that the right to develop, produce,
retain, transfer, and use weapons are sovereign rights protected by international law. After all, weapons are the very means by which States have come
into being. And it is this history that plays into and fosters the assumption that
weapons are necessary to the continued survival of the State. This reasoning
also serves to normalize the interweaving of the machinery of warfare into
the very fabric of the State. These beliefs are further reinforced by the symbolic value of weapons as a defining feature of State sovereignty; weapons
make States fully sovereign. Stripping a defeated enemy State of its weapons
is a deeply symbolic gendered act: it deprives a State of full sovereignty, and,
in that process, a relationship of domination and oppression is imposed. 220
This same pattern of symbolism is reproduced at the inter-personal level,
where the legitimate possession and use of weapons are often treated as a
measure of being fully [hu]man.
Fragmentation aside, the field of disarmament and arms control is
plagued by terminological ambiguity combined with technocratic detail. 221
Neither “disarmament” nor “arms control” are static terms. On a narrow
reading disarmament is understood as the elimination of the means by which
nations wage war, whereas, used as a generic term, it encompasses other
measures including limitation, reduction, and non-proliferation. Likewise,
arms control can be read narrowly within its Cold War context to denote
measures to limit the nuclear arms race in contrast to the far more expansive
contemporary usage to include agreement to freeze, limit, or abolish specific
categories of weapons. 222 If disarmament and arms control are indeed fluid
220. In 1919, WILPF’s activists instinctively recognized that unilateral disarmament
symbolized a stripping of sovereign rights and the imposition of a hierarchical relationship
precluding the possibility of peace, which cannot be founded on relations of oppression.
221. STUART CASEY-MASLEN & TOBIAS VESTNER, A GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT LAW 15 (2019).
222. Schelling and Halperin define arms control (in the context of Cold War bilateral
efforts) as “all the forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the interest
of reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and
economic costs of being prepared for it.” THOMAS SCHELLING & MORTON HALPERIN,
STRATEGY AND ARMS CONTROL 2 (1961). Den Dekker on the other hand posits that
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terms, one might also ask what precisely is envisaged by “general and complete disarmament under effective international control” in the contemporary setting. Typically, opacity is countered by repetition as though repetition
equates to elucidation. Lack of legal specificity is attacked for being utopian
yet concurrently claimed to further strategic interests. Technocratic detail diverts attention from what is silenced. But that, perhaps, is precisely the point.
Critical feminist international lawyers are less sanguine about the potential for international law, as currently interpreted and applied, to deliver radical change. Greater clarity and less fragmentation may indeed facilitate some
progress, but if feminist engagements have illuminated anything, it is that
until the drivers of weapons proliferation are disbanded, there is little chance
of making real progress on “general and complete disarmament under effective international control” let alone “universal and total disarmament,” understood as a far more radical ambition that entails the wholesale dismantling
of the machinery of war, public and private. In contrast to early feminist
peace activists, who viewed the emerging regime of international law as the
means by which an international order committed to peace, equality, and
justice could be secured, 223 a century of feminist engagements with international law has dampened expectations and injected doubt, 224 and sometimes

arms control refers to unilateral measures, bilateral and multilateral agreements as well as
informal regimes (“politically binding” documents, “soft” law) between States to limit or
reduce certain categories of weapons or military operations in order to achieve stable military balances and thus diminish tensions and the possibility of large-scale armed conflict.

Guido den Dekker, The Effectiveness of International Supervision in Arms Control Law, 9 JOURNAL
OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 315, 316 (2004).
223. See, in particular, resolutions adopted by WILPF during the first congress. 1915
CONGRESS REPORT, supra note 36.
224. See, for example, Kapur, who writes “in rereading/deconstructing the colonial
legacies as well as the gender and sexual hierarchies that constitute human rights, [critical]
scholarship has exposed how this project is incapable of meeting its promise of delivering
freedom to the disenfranchised.” RATNA KAPUR, GENDER, ALTERITY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: FREEDOM IN A FISHBOWL 8 (2018). Anghie likewise asks “if . . . the colonial encounter, with all its exclusions and subordinations, shaped the very foundations of international law, then grave questions must arise as to whether and how it is possible for the postcolonial world to construct a new international law that is liberated from these colonial
origins.” ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (2012).
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remorse, 225 in spite of the normative gains. 226 The law’s violence is all too
visible, as is its role in consolidating a hierarchical international order
founded on military strength through its greatest achievement to date, the
UN Charter. The prospect of having an equal part in shaping a shared future
promised by international law even though integrated into the text of the
Charter remains elusive, most notably in fields coded “masculine.” The very
fact that women are still under-represented and often deliberately excluded
from institutional fora concerned with weapons and disarmament decisionmaking, forty years after entry into force of CEDAW, is a catastrophic failure of
State responsibility. That in itself says something.
The obligation on States to ensure women’s equal representation and
participation in political and public life, including within international arenas,
has not been respected 227 despite the insistence on the part of the CEDAW
225. In the context of nuclear weapons, it is difficult not to conclude that every treaty
regime—apart from the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons—instantiates and
reinforces the exceptionalism of nuclear-weapon States.
226. While there has been progress over the decades, “the problem of challenging a
form of power without accepting its own terms of reference and hence losing the battle
before it has begun” remains a constant anxiety. CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE
POWER OF LAW 5 (1989).
227. Article 7 of CEDAW requires States parties,
to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the political
and public life of the country and, in particular, shall ensure to women, on equal terms with
men, the right: (a) To vote in all elections and public referenda and to be eligible for election
to all publicly elected bodies; (b) To participate in the formulation of government policy
and the implementation thereof and to hold public office and perform all public functions
at all levels of government; (c) To participate in non-governmental organizations and associations concerned with the public and political life of the country.

CEDAW, supra note 149, art. 7. For global statistics for January 2021, see Facts and Figures:
Women’s Leadership and Political Participation, UN WOMEN, https://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/leadership-and-political-participation/facts-and-figures (last
updated Jan. 15, 2021). See also Rachel B. Vogelstein & Alexandra Bro, Women’s Power Index,
CFR, https://www.cfr.org/article/womens-power-index (last updated Mar. 29, 2021). Article 8 of CEDAW requires States to take “all appropriate measures to ensure to women,
on equal terms with men and without any discrimination, the opportunity to represent their
Governments at the international level and to participate in the work of international organizations.” For States not party to CEDAW, Articles 2 and 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights apply. International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights arts. 2, 25, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. Paragraph 134 of the Platform for Action also emphasizes that “the equal access and full participation of women in power structures and their full involvement in all efforts for the prevention and resolution of conflicts
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Committee that Article 8 requires States to “ensure the presence of women
at all levels and in all areas of international affairs . . . [and] they be included
in economic and military matters, in both multilateral and bilateral diplomacy, and in official delegations to international and regional conferences.” 228 Little has changed in the twenty-five years since the Committee
first drew attention to the fact that women not only comprised a minority
but were concentrated in lower-level positions within the UN system and at
the regional level in economic, political, and military structures. The First
Committee of the General Assembly has had only a single female chair in
seventy-two sessions. 229 That States are not taking all appropriate measures,
including enactment of domestic legislation and temporary measures as set
forth in Article 4(1) of CEDAW to dismantle structural and systemic gender
discrimination, is all too evident. The Committee’s observations in 1997 that
“many crucial decisions on global issues, such as peacemaking and conflict
resolution, military expenditure and nuclear disarmament, development and
the environment, foreign aid and economic restructuring, are taken with limited participation of women,” 230 still apply in 2021.
Contemporary discussions on why women should be included are diversions that play into patriarchal privilege. 231 A century ago, women peace activists may have felt that justifying their right to a “seat at the disarmament
are essential for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.” Beijing Declaration
and Platform for Action, supra note 138, ¶ 134, at 57. The fact that the theme of 65th session
of the UN’s Commission on the Status of Women was “women’s full and effective participation and decision-making in public life” is evidence of State failure. See CSW65 (2021),
UN WOMEN, https://www.unwomen.org/en/csw/csw65-2021 (last visited May 21, 2021).
228. See UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No. 23: Political and Public Life ¶ 35 (1997),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CEDAW/Pages/Recommendations.aspx [hereinafter General Recommendation 23].
229. In 2010 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 65/69 on Women, disarmament,
non-proliferation and arms control, calling on States to promote the “equitable representation of
women in all decision-making processes with regard to matters related to disarmament, nonproliferation and arms control.” G.A. Res. 65/69, ¶ 1 (Jan. 13, 2011). Since then, the Assembly has adopted a further four resolutions.
230. General Recommendation No. 23, supra note 228, ¶ 39.
231. In particular, claims that emphasize women’s skills as “peace-builders” is a highrisk strategy that risks playing into essentialist narratives that are likely to be hugely counterproductive in the long term. Moreover, such strategies undermine the normative gains made.
The predominant belief among earlier generations that women, by their nature, biology, and
maternal instinct were more moral, nurturing, humane, and pacific than men and therefore
adverse to war and the instruments of warfare may have once assisted in creating a foothold
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table” was necessary, but the site of current scrutiny must be on why States
are not taking all appropriate measures to ensure equal and meaningful participation. It is axiomatic that equal representation is meaningless without
the power to shape and influence outcomes. 232 Nevertheless, without the
commitment to transform the structures and systems of power that give rise
to the harm in the first place, even the power to shape and influence is meaningless. Reform to increase women’s participation and the improvement of
the social status of women within existing social structures without addressing the gender systems upon which political, economic, social, and cultural
structures, institutions, and systems are founded will only reinforce systems
of domination predicated on coercion and violence. 233 The failure by States
to adopt measures to eliminate the causes of sexism—or for that matter all
other axes of difference such as racism and classism—is to perpetuate and
normalize social orderings founded on structures and systems of domination
in which weapons as a manifestation of that coercive power play a critical
role, whether deployed or not. Meaningful progress on disarmament cannot
be achieved without demystifying the symbolic value attached to all weapons
and eliminating the gender regimes that create and sustain the demand for

into public activities, but such essentialist claims were soon discarded as damaging to securing equality more broadly.
232. Otto, Holding up Half the Sky, supra note 141, at 7.
233. Cynthia Cockburn, Gender Relations as Causal in Militarization and War, 12 INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST JOURNAL OF POLITICS 139 (2010).
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them. Dislodging and reversing legal legacies establishing a gendered symbolic link between weapons, rights, 234 citizenship, 235 political power, 236 and
the cultural practices that knit together weapons and gender identities is
hampered by the fact that existing international law provides little assistance,
often limited by its own structure. For example, CEDAW’s preamble may
register the connections between “international peace and security,” “general
and complete disarmament including nuclear disarmament under strict and
effective international control,” and “equality,” but the most that the convention can do is to engage with weapons and disarmament through the
prism of non-discrimination. This is not to diminish the role played by the
CEDAW Committee, which has pressed for the need for a gender perspective to be incorporated into weapons treaties. 237 The Committee has repeatedly reminded States that conventional arms, especially small arms, including
diverted arms from the legal trade, can have a direct or indirect effect on
women as victims of conflict-related sexual violence, as victims of domestic
234. Historically, the duty to bear arms was intimately linked to the right to political
participation, with the former obligation imposed exclusively on men in times of war.
235. Citizenship rights have often been founded on military service and the obligation
to bear arms. For example, Rosika Schwimmer was denied US citizenship because she refused to answer affirmatively to question twenty-two of the Oath of Allegiance: “If necessary are you willing to take up arms in defense of this country?” Beth Wenger, Radical Politics
in a Reactionary Age: The Unmaking of Rosika Schwimmer, 1914-1930, 2 JOURNAL OF WOMEN’S
HISTORY 66, 86 (1990). According to Wenger, in their pleadings before the Supreme Court,
the Department of Justice urged the Court to refuse citizenship because,
she does not believe in other people bearing arms in defense of the country . . . [and] does
not believe in organized government as we understand it because organized government
cannot exist without military defense. She would see the Constitution and the government
of the U.S. destroyed by an enemy rather than have one citizen lift a finger in their defense.
If every citizen believed as she does and acted as she will, we would have no constitution
and no government.

Id. at 87–88.
236. Political power is nearly always linked directly to the bearing of arms and status as
a belligerent. For example, Jane Addams, commenting on the decision of the United States
to enter the war observed, “as head of a nation participating in the war, the President of the
United States would have a seat at the Peace Table, but that if he remained the representative
of a neutral country he could at best only ‘call through a crack in the door.’” ADDAMS,
PEACE AND BREAD, supra note 34, at 64.
237. Statement of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women on the Need for a Gender Perspective in the Text of the Arms Trade Treaty
(July 24, 2012), https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/statements/StatementGenderPerspective.pdf.
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violence, and also as protestors or actors in resistance movements. 238 It has
called attention to the fact that the proliferation of arms and ammunition
perpetuate and facilitate gender-based violence and atrocities confronted by
women in peace and conflict; 239 and has reminded States of their responsibility to address the gendered impact of international transfers of arms, especially small and illicit arms, including through the implementation of the
ATT. 240
More recently, feminist international lawyers have turned to the right to
peace as a potential site through which to further disarmament. 241 After all,
disarmament has long been an integral component to conceptions of peace,
even if understood as nothing other than the absence of war. To frame peace
as an enforceable positive right—not simply as an inter-State obligation—
would open the door to advancing disarmament and transformative
change. 242 The view that disarmament is a core dimension of the right to
peace was also shared by the UN Human Rights Council Advisory Committee, which was charged with producing a draft text on the Declaration on the

238. Id. But see U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,
Concluding Observations on the Fourth and Fifth Periodic Reports of Eritrea, ¶¶ 8–9, U.N.
Doc. CEDAW/C/ERI/CO/5 (Mar. 12, 2015); U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding Observations on the Combined Fourth and Fifth
Periodic Reports of Switzerland, ¶¶ 16–17, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/CHE/CO/4-5 (Nov.
25, 2016); U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding Observations on the Combined Seventh and Eighth Periodic Reports for France, ¶ 23,
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/FRA/Co/7-8 (July 25, 2016).
239. Statement of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women, supra note 237. U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women, General Recommendation No. 30 on Women in Conflict Prevention, Conflict and Post-conflict Situations, ¶ 29, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/30 (Nov. 1, 2013) [hereinafter General Recommendation No. 30].
240. General Recommendation No. 30, supra note 239.
241. The right to peace is recognized by the Organization of African Unity. See African
(Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 23, June 27, 1981, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 INTERNATIONAL LAW MATERIALS 58 (1982) (entered into force
Oct. 21, 1986). It is also recognized by the African Union. See Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Right on the Rights of Women in Africa art. 10, July 1, 2003,
(entered into force Nov. 25, 2005). In XYZ v. Republic of Benin, the African Court on Human
and Peoples’ Rights found Benin to have violated the claimant’s right to peace and security.
See XYZ v. Republic of Benin, Judgment, ¶ 137, App. No. 059/2019, Afr. Ct. Human and
Peoples’ Rights (Nov. 27, 2020).
242. Significantly, such a recognition would extend the range of available strategies
through which to hold States responsible.
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Right to Peace. 243 As the Advisory Committee noted, “the right to full disarmament must be understood to be part of the right of peoples to live in
peace. The right to disarmament should be a component of the right of peoples to peace as well as part of the right to international solidarity.” 244 Yet,
the final text adopted, reduced from an original fourteen operative articles
to a mere four plus a saving clause, makes no reference to disarmament or
human security. 245 Adopted by the General Assembly in 2017, the Peace
Declaration stands as a reminder of what has been redacted, silenced, and
situated beyond scrutiny and State responsibility. 246
The Peace Declaration is far from being the only instance where disarmament has been taken off the agenda of a multilateral normative initiative
pertaining to peace. 247 Attempts by anti-war feminists to include disarmament in the final text of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace
and Security was met with resistance, and the decision not to pursue the
243. U.N. Human Rights Council, Progress Report of the Human Rights Council Advisory
Committee on the Right of Peoples to Peace, §§ IV(B), (C), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/39 (Apr. 1,
2011).
244. Id. ¶ 30 (see also the “proposed standards”).
245. Perhaps most regressively, with the insertion of the word “enjoy,” the right of
peoples to peace was recast as a “right to enjoy peace.” See G.A. Res. 71/189, art. 1, Declaration on the Right to Peace (Feb. 2, 2017).
246. While the resolution rightly refers to racism, racial discrimination, and xenophobia
as obstacles to peace, disappointingly, what was missing from the original text was any references to the harmful consequences of sexism, homophobia, misogyny, and patriarchy.
Christine Chinkin, Women and the Right to Peace, LSE (Apr. 21, 2020),
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/wps/2020/04/21/women-and-the-right-to-peace/.
247. It is noteworthy that the UN’s most ambitious program for global change, the
2030 Sustainable Development Goals, is silent on disarmament. The effort on the part of
the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs to link Goal 16, “to promote peaceful and inclusive
societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective,
accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels” to its work only serves to bring to light
that disarmament is missing from the agenda. Izumi Nakamitsu, UN High Representative
for Disarmament Affairs, Advancing Disarmament within the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, UN CHRONICLE (Aug. 2018), https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/advancing-disarmament-within-2030-agenda-sustainable-development. Likewise, the most that the
Secretary-General can claim is
excessive spending on weapons drains resources for sustainable development. It is incompatible with creating stable, inclusive societies, strong institutions, effective governance and
democracy, and a culture of respect for human rights. My initiative will have a strong basis
also in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the world’s blueprint for peace and
prosperity on a healthy planet.

Antonio Guterres, supra note 1.
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matter was a high price to pay for women’s admission into the realms of
Security Council decision-making. 248 The deal struck was a regressive comprise that, in effect, reinscribed the gendered boundaries that anti-war feminists had fought against throughout the UN Decade for Women and had
torn down, albeit partially, in Beijing. 249
Twenty-five years after Beijing, the barriers have been re-erected. The
political declaration by States to commemorate the anniversary is silent on
disarmament, 250 in stark contrast to the Secretary-General’s report released
three months earlier reviewing progress and noting how women’s activism
in the intervening period had “focused on the links between achieving gender equality and peace, reducing military expenditure, controlling the availability of armaments and promoting non-violent forms of conflict resolution.” 251 While the report recognizes the significant contributions made by
feminist activism to advance disarmament through treaties, it situates these
achievements in the broader context and concludes:
the implementation of global commitments on disarmament has been stymied by increased military spending, the continued spread of small arms
248. As Otto laments:
Perhaps Resolution 1325’s most instructive omission, when it comes to selectivity, is its
failure to make any reference to general disarmament, a long-standing goal of women’s
peace movements . . . . So, the price of the Council’s endorsement of women’s participation
in peacemaking and peace-building, and its increased accessibility to the NGO Working
Group, is the silencing of feminist critiques of militarism and the failure to recognise the
“inextricable” link between gender equality and peace.

Dianne Otto, The Exile of Inclusion: Reflections on Gender Issues in International Law Over the Last
Decade, 10 MELBOURNE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 11, 21 (2009). Ironically, if that
was indeed the “trade-off,” it was a poor one given that women still continue to be excluded
from peacemaking and peace-building. Cohn, Mainstreaming Gender, supra note 215.
249. Although some commentators have suggested that the Women, Peace and Security resolutions, including S.C. Res.1325 (Oct. 31, 2000), S.C. Res.1820 (June 19, 2008), S.C.
Res.1888 (2009), S.C. Res.1889 (Sept. 30, 2009), S.C. Res.2106 (June 24, 2013), S.C. Res.
2122 (Oct. 18, 2013), and S.C. Res. 2467 (Apr. 23, 2019), speak to disarmament, the references contained therein concern the disarmament of non-State actors rather than States.
250. U.N. Commission on the Status of Women, Draft Resolution Submitted by the
Chair of the Commission, Political Declaration on the Occasion of the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Fourth World Conference on Women, U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/2020/L.1 (Mar.
2, 2020).
251. U.N. Secretary-General, Review and Appraisal of the Implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and the Outcomes of the Twenty-third Special Session of the General Assembly, ¶ 237, U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/2020/3 (Dec. 13, 2019).
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and light weapons, the development of new weapons and growing tensions
between rivals armed with nuclear weapons (S/2019/800). Global military
spending nearly doubled from 1995 levels to $1.82 trillion in 2018. . . . Such
spending deprives national budgets of resources for social spending, which
is critical to achieving gender equality. In about one third of countries for
which data are available, government military spending is higher than
health expenditure.252

The passage is a reminder of the chasm between legal undertakings and
State practice. Perhaps more disturbing, it is a testament of how what should
be entirely unreasonable has been made routine and banal. Two weeks after
the release of the report, news began to emerge from Wuhan of cases of
“viral pneumonia.” Calls by the Secretary-General for ceasefires went unheeded while, throughout 2020, States invested in the production of arms
took steps to categorize those in the defense sector as “essential workers”
and thus exempt from lockdown restrictions. As governments took
measures (some more than others) to mitigate the effects of the virus, the
vernacular of militarism took over. 253
Where does this leave feminist efforts to advance universal disarmament
in 2021 and beyond?
After four years of inter-State political instability, many welcomed the
new Biden administration in Washington and the prospect of a return to
normalcy, predictability, stability, and reason. Multilateralism and international law appear to be back on the agenda with signs that the administration
is developing an “ambitious agenda to negotiate new arms control treaties”
and its intention to review the “nuclear modernization portfolio” introduced
by the previous administration that was expected to cost half a trillion dollars
over the next decade alone. 254 Biden’s decision to extend New START just
days before the treaty was due to expire was read as going beyond the terms
of the treaty, a symbolic gesture to re-engage in dialogue coming not long
after the expiry of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty amidst accusations of breaches and the collapse of the arms control system that had

252. Id.
253. Christine Chinkin & Madeleine Rees, Our Male Leaders Declared War on the Pandemic.
Our Response Must Match That, LSE (May 11, 2020), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/wps/2020/
05/11/our-male-leaders-declared-war-on-the-pandemic-our-response-must-match-that/.
254. Bryan Bender, “This is Going to be Quite a Show”: Biden’s Arms Control Team Eyes
Nuclear Policy Overhaul, POLITICO (Jan. 27, 2021), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/
01/27/biden-nuclear-weapons-policy-463335.
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existed since the Cold War. 255 It is too early to tell whether the return to a
more liberal agenda may entail the resurrection of an ambition articulated
over a decade ago with a shift from the language of nuclear non-proliferation
to reduction and disarmament. 256 For the moment, at least, the priority appears to be on non-proliferation. 257 However, what the return to a liberal
255. In February 2019 the United States suspended its observance of the IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces Treaty, pointing to evidence that Russia was developing and deploying SSC-8/9M729 cruise missiles. The failure of countermeasures by the United States resulted in the United States formally withdrawing from the treaty in August, citing a “material
breach” on the part of Russia. The collapse of the treaty marked a serious erosion of the
system of nuclear arms control that had existed since end of Cold War and which had resulted in the complete elimination of U.S. and Russian nuclear and conventional groundlaunched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5500 kilometers.
256. In a speech on April 5, 2009, President Obama declared:
So today, I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and
security of a world without nuclear weapons. I’m not naive. This goal will not be reached
quickly—perhaps not in my lifetime. It will take patience and persistence. . . . . Now, let me
describe to you the trajectory we need to be on. First, the United States will take concrete
steps towards a world without nuclear weapons. To put an end to Cold War thinking, we
will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to
do the same. . . . To reduce our warheads and stockpiles, we will negotiate a new Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty with the Russians this year. . . . And this will set the stage for further
cuts, and we will seek to include all nuclear weapons states in this endeavor. To achieve a
global ban on nuclear testing, my administration will immediately and aggressively pursue
U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. . . . And to cut off the building
blocks needed for a bomb, the United States will seek a new treaty that verifiably ends the
production of fissile materials intended for use in state nuclear weapons.

President Barack Obama, Remarks at Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic (Apr. 5,
2009), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barac
k-obama-prague-delivered.
257. Although in his first foreign policy statement on February 4, 2021, President Biden
announced the end to “all American support for offensive operations in the war in Yemen,
including relevant arms sales” he then added an important caveat: “At the same time, Saudi
Arabia faces missile attacks, UAV strikes, and other threats from Iranian-supplied forces in
multiple countries. We’re going to continue to support and help Saudi Arabia defend its
sovereignty and its territorial integrity and its people.” President Joe Biden, America’s Place
in the World, Remarks at the U.S. Department of State Headquarters (Feb. 4, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarksby-president-biden-on-americas-place-in-the-world/ (emphasis added). In other words, as
elaborated by Alex Ward, although it is likely (albeit not certain) that the United States will
no longer provide Saudi Arabia with precision-guided munitions nor the UAE (a coalition
partner) with F-35 fighters, the new administration has reserved the right to provide its allies
with defensive arms and has kept the diplomatic door open while steps are taken to re-enter
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agenda is likely to involve is the resumption of the program of advancing
disarmament through incremental steps; in other words, a commitment to
partial disarmament. 258 Feminist support for partial measures has been equivocal. It has oscillated between a pragmatism (something is surely better than nothing) that is simultaneously plagued by a deep disquiet (rooted in the
knowledge that partial measures conceal the very deferment of the ultimate
goal) and an idealism that risks exclusion. 259 Either way, the return to normalcy, to the status quo ante, is precisely what anti-war feminists fear the most.
What went before led us precisely to where we are today: that is the catastrophe. 260
As for the existing multilateral institutions, there is little hope that any
meaningful progress on advancing general and complete disarmament will
materialize in the foreseeable future. The view expressed by the SecretaryGeneral that “since the beginning of the twenty-first century, multilateral
disarmament institutions have remained in a state of stagnation. These bodies do not seem to function as an essential part of what should be the integral
architecture of peace and security” 261 is shared by those within and outside
the UN. The Conference on Disarmament—the only multilateral negotiating
body for disarmament—has been paralyzed for at least the last twenty-four
years. Its last major achievement—agreeing to the text of a comprehensive
the 2018 nuclear agreement with Iran, abandoned under the previous administration and
strongly opposed by Saudi Arabia. Alex Ward, Biden’s Announcement on Ending US Support for
the War in Yemen, Explained, VOX (Feb. 5, 2021), https://www.vox.com/22268082/bidenyemen-war-saudi-state-speech.
258. Every previous major multilateral arms control treaty has, in its preamble, claimed
to represent one more step towards the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament.
See the preambles of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, 1977 Environmental Modification Convention; 1981 Certain Conventional Weapons Convention; 1992 Chemical
Weapons Convention; 1996 Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, and 1996 African NuclearWeapons-Free Zone.
259. For example, at its 4th Congress in 1924, WILPF adopted a resolution stating:
Believing that work towards disarmament in different counties should not wait until general
disarmament can be realized, though general disarmament is our goal, we welcome with
profound satisfaction the suggestion of the President of the United States in regard to the
calling of an International Conference to deal with limitation of armaments.

4TH CONGRESS REPORT, supra note 51, at 138.
260. WALTER BENJAMIN, ILLUMINATIONS 253–64 (Harry Zohn trans., Hannah Arendt
ed., Schocken Books, 1969) (1955) (setting forth Benjamin’s theses on the philosophy of
history).
261. U.N. OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, supra note 2, at 61.
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nuclear test ban treaty—has not come into force. 262 The wisdom of continued engagement with bodies such as the Conference on Disarmament has
been a cause of constant angst for anti-war feminists. But, in 2015, a century
after first demanding to be included within the multilateral institution spaces
of disarmament, WILPF announced that it had decided to cease engaging
with the Conference on Disarmament. 263 The strategy is not without some
risk given the shrinking spaces for political activism. But it also raises important questions for anti-war feminists about the value of operating within
institutional spaces that are no longer fully committed to the ambitions upon
which they were originally founded.
Amidst this somewhat bleak landscape a window of opportunity has
been opened for anti-war feminists to pursue a transformative disarmament
agenda and to do so from the site of power. In September 2020, in the runup to the twentieth anniversary of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda,
the Secretary-General released his annual report on Women, Peace and Security. 264 Buried within section III on “Building and sustaining peace: linking
the women and peace and security agenda to achieve the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development” is subsection A, entitled “Disarmament and arms
control.” The section opens with the simple yet subversive assertion that
disarmament is both vital to the achievement of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals and “central to realizing the women and peace and security
agenda.” 265 The report continues:
Disarmament is core to what was originally envisioned for the women and
peace and security agenda. It also features prominently in the section on
women and armed conflict of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for
Action, under the strategic objective and related commitments to reduce
excessive military expenditures and control the availability of armaments.

262. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, opened for signature Sept. 24, 1996, 35 INLEGAL MATERIALS 1439 (1996) (not yet in force) (adopted by the General
Assembly as Resolution A/RES/50/245 (Sept. 10, 1996)).
263. See WILPF Statement to the Conference on Disarmament on International Women's Day
2015, REACHING CRITICAL WILL, https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/news/latestnews/9559-wilpf-statement-to-the-conference-on-disarmament-on-international-womens-day-2015 (last visited May 21, 2021) (WILPF’s statement on its decision to cease engaging
with the Conference on Disarmament).
264. U.N. Secretary-General, Women and Peace and Security, U.N. Doc. S/2020/946 (Sept.
25, 2020).
265. Id. ¶ 45.
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However, the connections between the disarmament agenda and the
women and peace and security agenda are yet to be fully explored. 266

Although the report falls short of referring explicitly to “general and complete disarmament,” the concept sits there in the references to the Beijing
Declaration and in the reminder of the “fiftieth anniversary of the entry into
force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” and call
for “a strong recommitment to the elimination of weapons of mass destruction.” 267 Thus, while Resolution 1325 may have appeared to foreclose the
possibility for debate on disarmament and thereby preclude it from being a
potential site from which to advance disarmament, the Secretary-General’s
report has re-situated it into the agenda where it has always belonged and
under the first of the four pillars, conflict prevention. Whether anti-war feminists who have consistently maintained that disarmament is a precondition
to both peace and security will take advantage of this “invitation” remains to
be seen. The Secretary-General’s understanding of the scope of the Women,
Peace and Security agenda certainly corresponds with the analysis laid out in
the 2015 Global Study commissioned by the Security Council in preparation
for the high-level review. 268 Authored by Radhika Coomaraswamy, former
Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, with the support of a seventeen-member high-level advisory group, the report took a more expansive
view of prevention to include conflict prevention, in contradistinction to the
more narrow interpretation of the prevention pillar adopted by States. 269
Conflict prevention, according to the Global Study, required States to “address the underlying causes of war and violence. . . . They include efforts to
address structural inequality and violence, promote human rights and human
security, and engage in demilitarization, disarmament and reduction in
spending on armaments.” 270
In the six years since the release of the report, States have shown little
appetite to embrace this view. Admittedly, the very construction of the
Women, Peace and Security agenda functions as a legal obstacle to the extent
266. Id. ¶ 47.
267. Id. ¶ 50.
268. S.C. Res. 2122, ¶ 16 (Oct. 18, 2013). See also RADHIKA COOMARASWAMY, PREVENTING CONFLICT, TRANSFORMING JUSTICE, SECURING PEACE: A GLOBAL STUDY ON
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1325
(2015).
269. Over the years, the Security Council has focused its attention and activities under
the prevention pillar to addressing sexual and gender-based violence.
270. COOMARASWAMY, supra note 268, at 204.
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that it is grounded in international legal instruments that are concerned with
regulating State conduct in respect of individuals and or groups. The operative paragraphs in Resolution 1325 cite key IHL instruments, refugee law,
international human rights law, including CEDAW and the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, and international criminal law; in other words, the
Security Council has limited its engagement with “women” through their
identity rather than through issues that shape their lives. While weapons determine the context within which lives are lived, they are cast by international
law as a matter that falls within the exclusive concern of inter-State relations.
This need not remain the case. International law is a regime constructed
by States. The dichotomized structure adopted is simply the reflection of
political choices. In adopting 1325, the Security Council situated the Women,
Peace and Security agenda squarely within international law in recalling the
purposes and principles of the UN Charter and its own legal responsibility
under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. 271
2020—which marked the 75th anniversary of the UN and the 20th anniversary
of the Women, Peace and Security agenda—should have provided States
with an opportunity to critically reflect on their record of achievements in
light of the stated ambition of the Charter and to recognize that little has
been achieved in advancing universal and complete disarmament.
In his Agenda for Disarmament report, the Secretary-General concludes
with a quote from his predecessor, Dag Hammarskjöld, who cautioned that
“in this field, as we well know, a standstill does not exist; if you do not go
forward, you do go backward.” If anything can be gleaned from a century of
feminist peace activism, it is that accepting the status quo has never been an
option. Today, the challenges confronted seem more daunting than ever,
whether in the shape of meaningful participation or countering cultures of
militarism 272 and patriarchy that sustain the demand for weapons and that,
in turn, serve to mold our identities and our communities. Critical feminists
remain all too aware of the need to constantly draw attention to the insidious
language of militarism and of gender relentlessly invoked by political figures
in the public sphere 273 and popular culture if those chains are to be broken.
Exposing myths, false narratives (“every government defends its participation in the

271. S.C. Res. 1325, pmbl. (Oct. 31, 2000).
272. Dan Sabbagh, Brexit “Can Enhance UK’s Lethality,” says Defence Secretary, GUARDIAN
(Feb. 10, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/feb/11/brexit-uk-militarydefence-gavin-williamson.
273. Chinkin & Rees, supra note 253.
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arms race as necessary to guard its national security. But this is an illusion” 274) and
distinctions that are repeatedly recited as though the difference between the
two is self-evident (what distinguishes offensive from defensive weapons?) are undertakings that demand constant commitment. None of this work is new. Feminist strategies will alter over time, as does thinking. But what has remained
constant is the belief that a sustainable peace cannot be attained without universal and total disarmament, which can only be secured through fundamental transformative change in the existing order at inter-personal, intra-State,
and inter-State levels.
VI.

EPILOGUE

De Martens was right to describe the Utopians as “the most dangerous enemies of the progress of international law.” What he instinctively knew was
that a world in which international law delivered universal disarmament, eternal peace, and the abolition of war was one in which power—including the
power to make and shape international law—no longer rested in the hands
of a privileged few. It would be a world radically transformed and one in
which power was equally distributed, among States and among people.

274. MYRDAL, supra note 119, at 7.
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